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ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF STANDARDS 
FOR LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS* 
RICHARD K. GORDON** 
Current trends in international legal scholarship have shifted from a 
paradigm of state actors working within recognized sources of 
international law to one that includes networks of domestic 
regulators that develop and implement best practices or standards 
on a global basis. The new paradigm can be seen in operation in the 
efforts by onshore jurisdictions (most of which are financial centers 
themselves) to restrict the activities of offshore financial centers. 
Onshore jurisdictions enlisted these regulatory networks, as well as 
key international organizations, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development and the International 
Monetary Fund, to advance new standards for income taxation, 
prudential regulation, and money laundering in offshore centers. By 
2005, offshore centers’ compliance with financial, regulatory, and 
money laundering standards was largely complete, while there was 
less success with income tax standards. The current financial crisis, 
however, has spurred renewed efforts, particularly with respect to 
the latter. An analysis of this experience suggests that the new 
paradigm should view regulatory networks in the context of a 
complex system of states and international organizations that 
possess the qualities of such regulatory networks. A system of 
global governance that includes both regulatory networks and these 
international organizations advances fairness and objectivity and, in 
 
        *  © 2010 Richard K. Gordon.  
      ** Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; 
Adjunct Professor of International Studies, Brown University. B.A. Yale (1978). J.D. 
Harvard Law School (1984). From 1994 through 2003, the author served as a senior staff 
member at the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and worked on each of the 
substantive issues discussed in this Article. While the author has taken great pains not to 
use any confidential information in writing the Article, he does on occasion refer to non-
confidential discussions among IMF Executive Directors, management, and staff, as well 
as government officials dealing with the IMF. Occasionally, this includes direct quotes that 
the author has not attributed to a specific source so as to avoid any possible adverse 
repercussions. Much information concerning the nature and activities of organizations 
discussed in this Article is derived from the personal experiences of the author. Nothing in 
this Article should be taken as representing the official views of the IMF or anyone 
involved in formulating the policies discussed. Thanks to Rebecca Cage, Jonathan Adler, 
Craig Boise, Peter Gerhart, Jacqui Lipton, David Kennedy, and Andy Morris. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571641
GORDON.PTD5 2/9/2010  1:23 PM 
502 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
particular, may protect weak states from the coercive power of the 
stronger. 
Let us rather turn to a much-praised strength of the modern 
person, with the truly awkward question whether, on account of 
his well-known historical “Objectivity,” he has a right to call 
himself . . . just, and just to a higher degree than the people of 
other times. Is it true that this objectivity originates from a 
heightened need and demand for justice? Or does it . . . merely 
create the appearance that justice might be its real cause? Does 
this objectivity perhaps tempt one to a detrimental and too 
flattering bias . . . ?1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics and International 
Business at New York University, Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of 
Economics and Public Policy at Harvard University and former Chief 
Economist at the International Monetary Fund, and Nariman 
Behravesh, Chief Economist and Executive Vice President for IHS 
Global Insight, all agree that the current financial crisis is the worst 
since the Great Depression.2 From the U.S. financial sector, collapse 
has spread throughout the developed world,3 though curiously, it has 
affected most of the developing world less.4 Governments5 and 
international financial institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF” or “the Fund”),6 have called for a total 
review of how national regulatory structures apparently failed so 
spectacularly. Many have called for a significant overhaul of domestic 
supervisory systems,7 while some have called for the creation of 
transnational regulators.8 Yet, while it was the financial institutions 
and supervisory systems of the largest financial centers, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, that failed so spectacularly, 
the governments of these countries have tried to pin at least some of 
 
 2. David Pendery, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since 
Great Depression, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/ 
idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227. 
 3. Deutche Welle, Chronology: Financial Crisis Spreads from US to World Markets 
(Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3689713,00.html.  
 4. INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
NAVIGATING THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AHEAD, at xi (2009), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
 5. Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, Op-Ed., A New Financial Foundation, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15; GROUP OF TWENTY, DECLARATION ON 
STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1–5 (2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/ 
Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf. 
 6. IMF, THE RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL—INITIAL ASSESSMENT, POLICY 
LESSONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE 12–14 (2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Michael Knigge, Nationalized Banks Are “Only Answer,” Economist Stiglitz Says, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE, June 2, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4005355,00.html; 
Patrick Wintour, We Need International Regulation to Protect Global Economy, Brown 
Tells World Leaders, GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/ 
sep/25/gordonbrown.marketturmoil. 
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the blame on an old whipping horse: offshore financial centers 
(“OFCs”).9 
As absurd as this may sound—trying to shift blame to tiny 
jurisdictions—it has always been so, or at least from the early 1990s.10 
Government authorities from the United States and a number of 
other developed countries focused on three financial areas where 
they claimed OFCs were acting dangerously: income taxation, 
prudential financial regulation, and anti-money laundering and 
terrorism financing. By and large, there was no generally accepted 
international law governing these issues. Rather, onshore jurisdictions 
looked to something other than law: generally accepted standards or 
best practices. It was an appeal to follow these standards, not law, 
that dominated the calls for change in offshore behavior. And while 
the implementation of coercive or “hard power”11 of states played an 
essential role in changing the behavior of offshore jurisdictions, it was 
the “soft power” of persuasion, that the standards were in fact best 
practices, that may have played the most important role. 
 The struggle of these onshore jurisdictions to adhere to non-
legal standards was an excellent example of the operation of what 
scholars have termed transnational regulatory networks (“TRNs”)—
informal groups of domestic regulators that, over time, create 
 
 9. GROUP OF TWENTY, supra note 5, at 4–5. There are a number of different ways of 
defining what constitutes an offshore financial center. One is to use seven criteria: (1) a 
primary orientation of business toward nonresidents, (2) a favorable regulatory 
environment, (3) a low- or zero-taxation scheme, (4) a disproportion between the size of 
the financial sector and the domestic financing needs, (5) a disproportionate dealing in 
currencies that are not the currency of the jurisdiction where the center is located, (6) 
banking activity that is primarily entrepôt business, and (7) a separation from major 
regulatory states. Ahmed Zoromé, Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an 
Operational Definition 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 07/87, 2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf. Because this Article is concerned 
primarily with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(“OECD”) Harmful Tax Practices Project, the IMF’s Offshore Financial Center 
assessment project, and the Financial Action Task Force’s Non-Cooperating Countries 
and Territories Project, it will refer to the key traits and lists of jurisdictions used in those 
programs. See infra Appendix. 
 10. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1. 
 11. “As defined by Joseph Nye, hard power is ‘command power that can be used to 
induce others to change their position.’ It works through both carrots and sticks, rewards 
and threats. Soft power, by contrast, flows from the ability to convince others they want 
what you want.” Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 291 (2004) (quoting JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX 
OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 9 
(2002)) [hereinafter Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power]. “Nye first elaborated the concept 
of soft power in an earlier work.” Id. at 291 n.28 (citing JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO 
LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER 188–201 (1990)). 
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generally accepted regulatory standards.12 By the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, onshore jurisdictions largely 
succeeded in securing compliance with financial regulatory and 
money laundering standards, but had less success with their initial 
goals with respect to income taxation.13 How this system developed, 
and the reasons for its successes and failures, may have much to teach 
as to how the new engagement with offshore centers should proceed. 
In Part I, this Article begins by discussing the current state of 
legal theory concerning transnational regulatory networks. It then 
examines some of the problems with that theory, and suggests that, in 
addition to informal groups of domestic regulators, international 
organizations with TRN characteristics could play an important role 
in developing and applying standards or best practices. It contrasts 
these with organizations lacking key TRN characteristics. Part I 
proposes that these TRNs, along with states themselves, form a 
system that creates and applies standards. It suggests that the success 
or failure of these systems could depend on certain characteristics 
found in the TRNs and international organizations, characteristics 
that legitimize both the standard itself and the process by which 
adherence is assessed. The better the characteristics of a particular 
system’s participants, the better the resulting standards and 
implementation of those standards. 
Part II tests the hypotheses in Part I by analyzing how offshore 
centers, TRNs, international organizations with TRN characteristics, 
and onshore jurisdictions addressed the claims that offshore centers 
failed to comply with certain income tax, financial regulatory, and 
anti-money laundering standards. Part II.B analyzes how the failure 
to involve a TRN or international organization with key TRN 
characteristics hampered the efforts of onshore jurisdictions with 
respect to income tax. Particularly, it discusses how the absence of a 
broadly agreed upon income tax standard, and lack of an impartial 
compliance assessment process, reduced both the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of those efforts. It concludes by describing how a scaled-
back effort adopting some TRN and quasi-TRN components has 
resulted in some success by onshore jurisdictions. Part II.C continues 
the analysis by examining how the participation of both a TRN and 
international organization with TRN characteristics advanced the 
efforts of onshore jurisdictions with respect to prudential regulation. 
It discusses how the presence of a broadly agreed upon standard and 
 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Parts II.B.2, C.2, and D.2. 
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an impartial compliance assessment process created both legitimacy 
and effectiveness, and how the process served to protect the interests 
of the offshore jurisdictions. Part II.D continues the analysis by 
looking at the role of another TRN and the same international 
organization with respect to money laundering, reaching similar 
conclusions based on analogous facts. 
Part III.A reviews the conclusions of the previous Part and 
argues that countries, TRNs, and organizations with key TRN 
characteristics constitute a system that can be seen as an organic 
whole. It further argues that it was the presence of certain key 
characteristics within the system that largely determined how the 
system operated, as well as its successes and failures. The Article 
argues that the IMF, with its blend of key TRN and certain key non-
TRN characteristics, played an important role in legitimating such 
coordinated action among domestic regulators in the case of financial 
and anti-money laundering standards. The Article also argues that the 
IMF played an important role in restraining the application of local 
power by onshore jurisdictions, thereby helping ensure that OFCs 
were treated more fairly by the system than they otherwise would 
have been. 
In Part III.B, the Article proposes a modification to the 
paradigm of the operation of TRNs. Lastly, the Article draws some 
final conclusions concerning the benefits and drawbacks of standards 
in guiding international behavior. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. TRNs and Global Governance 
Over the past decade and a half, scholarly inquiry into the source 
and operation of international law has undergone significant 
development. The earlier paradigm was one of unitary state actors, 
working either by themselves or through formal international 
organizations, within the context of recognized sources of 
international law (i.e., international conventions, international 
customary law, general principles of law recognized by “civilized” 
nations, judicial decisions, and teachings of experts).14 The focus of 
inquiry was primarily on the rights and obligations of states (including 
 
 14. Annex to U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102–03 (1986) (defining various sources of 
international law and identifying evidence of international law). 
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those found in the charters of international organizations), the 
adjudication of breaches in the law, and the imposition of sanctions.15  
The new focus looks beyond these basic parameters.16 Instead of 
treating states as unitary actors, scholars have drawn attention to the 
disaggregation of state sovereignty; states act in the international 
system, not just through their executives, but through their various 
domestic governmental institutions, including ministries, courts, 
legislatures, and regulatory agencies.17 These various governmental 
units may communicate with each other through global policy 
networks and not just through the State (e.g., foreign ministries) or 
formal international organizations.18 Throughout, two key factors in 
the development of international law have been natural law (i.e., 
what is inherently right or wrong) and positivism (i.e., what is in the 
self-interest of states).19 
Key players in these developments have been domestic 
regulatory agencies, including those that supervise the banking, 
insurance, and securities sectors. These domestic regulators are 
guided in large part by the application of technical expertise. They 
share their expertise and other information through semi-formal 
transnational regulatory networks. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (“Basel Committee”)20 and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissioners (“IOSCO”) are cited as 
 
15.  See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY (3d ed. 2005). 
 16. David Kennedy, a principal contributor to the new scholarship, has recently 
outlined the development of new approaches to international legal theory in The Mystery 
of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827 (2008). 
 17. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 325. Like David Kennedy, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter is a principal contributor to the new scholarship. 
 18. See, e.g., David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence 
of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284 (1998) 
(noting how non-treaty international financial regulatory organizations cooperate to 
develop transnational rules or standards). 
 19. David D. Jividen, Rediscovering International Law Through Dialogue Rather than 
Diatribe: Reflections on an International Legal Conference in the Aftermath of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 693–99 (2004). 
 20. The Basel Committee was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the 
G-10: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS 
MEMBERSHIP 1 (2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf?noframes=1. According to the 
Committee’s Web site, “[o]ne important objective of the Committee’s work has been to 
close gaps in international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic principles: that no 
foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and that supervision should be 
adequate.” Id. at 1–2. 
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being among the more influential TRNs.21 These informal groups of 
national regulators have no legal personality, have little or no staff, 
and have little or no formal system of internal governance. Rather, 
they consist of officials from national regulators who agree to meet on 
an occasional basis and to reach agreement by consensus. Other 
TRNs may coordinate among themselves through semiformal supra-
TRNs like the Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”), which includes 
these TRNs themselves as members.22 
These TRNs, through application of the collective expertise of 
their members and through the building of consensus, develop best 
practices or standards to address technical regulatory issues faced by 
most or all domestic regulators. These standards are then 
promulgated as technical guidance for all regulators.23 For example, 
the Basel Committee is concerned with preserving the safety and 
soundness of the banking system.24 Composed of a number of 
domestic banking regulators from the most important banking 
centers, the Basel Committee’s various standards are designed to 
promote a public good—a sound banking system—that is of benefit to 
all.25 And, in a world with an increasingly interconnected financial 
system where one weak link may jeopardize the entire system, the 
diffusion of best practices among all regulators benefits each 
jurisdiction individually. If the Basel Committee’s standards truly 
address the technical problem of how best to regulate and supervise 
the banking system, then problems of conflicting principle or 
ideology, or of national self-interest, should be minimized.26 
Of great importance is the fact that acceptance of these best 
practices or standards is primarily accomplished not through the hard 
power of sanctions but through more subtle peer pressure or 
 
 21. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 315. 
 22. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Informational 
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1046–47 n.16 (2003) 
[hereinafter Slaughter, Global Government Networks]. Membership in the Financial 
Stability Forum includes the IMF, a treaty-based international organization. See id.; 
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 289 n.26. 
 23. Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for International 
Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 411 (2007). 
 24. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE 
NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: AN EXPLANATORY NOTE 1 (2001) [hereinafter BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION], http://www.bis.org/ publ/bcbsca01.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. This is not to say that the resulting standards would then prove to be wise, in that 
purely technical failures might still result. The recent crisis affecting the worldwide 
banking sector suggests that, at a minimum, banking supervisory standards were poorly 
conceived from a purely technical perspective. 
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persuasion.27 In other words, “[the system] co-opts people rather than 
coerces them.”28 TRNs help educate local regulators and convince 
them that the standards agreed upon are truly best practices. In 
addition, scholars have argued that the market, reacting to the 
regulatory best practices, can also provide incentives for 
performance.29 Many have referred to this shift from traditional 
international law to less formal standard-building through TRNs as 
part of a global movement from “government” to “governance.”30 
Because transnational regulatory networks bring highly 
developed expertise to address common problems, the solutions they 
offer should be less ideologically or politically motivated than those 
of states acting individually or in like-minded groups. Like turning to 
organizations of doctors for medical advice or engineers for views on 
building bridges, turning to banking regulators for views on how to 
maintain a safe and sound banking system simply makes good sense. 
Implementing their advice, therefore, should be in the best interests 
of everyone. While states are motivated to develop policies that are 
self-serving, TRNs are motivated primarily to develop policies that 
are truly best practices. And, while states may rely on the hard or 
coercive power of carrots and sticks to enforce their views, TRNs rely 
more on soft power, meaning simple persuasion. The emergence of 
TRNs, therefore, may be of great benefit to the world. TRNs create 
those standards that succeed in promoting improved behavior without 
having to create new law. 
B. The Limitations of TRNs 
Scholars of the globalization of regulatory law have, however, 
noted some problems when standard-setting is shifted from the 
national to the global level, from local regulators to international 
 
 27. Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 22, at 1061. Of course, even 
breaches in accepted international law may result only in peer pressure and not formal 
hard power sanctions. 
 28. Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 11, at 291 (quoting JOSEPH S. NYE, 
JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER 
CAN'T GO IT ALONE 9 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. Weber & Arner, supra note 23, at 411. 
 30. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 16, at 832 (describing the transition to a focus on 
global governance); Sol Picciotto, Regulatory Networks and Global Governance 7 (June 
27–29, 2006), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/232/1/Reg_Networks_&_Glob_Gov.pdf 
(manuscript of speech given at The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of 
London, workshop) (detailing the regulation of international financial markets through 
global governance). 
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standard-setting bodies.31 Chief among these is a potential lack of 
legitimacy. For instance, accountability of TRNs may be limited, in 
that bureaucrats operating at the TRN level may not be accountable 
to individual state governments or to people as a whole.32 Further, it 
is typically true that not every domestic regulatory authority is 
represented within a typical TRN. The Basel Committee, for 
example, includes only the regulatory authorities of twenty-seven 
countries, most of which are developed or very large.33 This can cause 
at least three major problems. First, a lack of representation may 
result in the interests of member regulatory bodies being promoted 
over those of non-members. To the extent that national regulators 
favor the interests of their own states over a hypothetical best practice 
for the world as a whole, the resulting standards may be tainted by 
state self-interest.34 This may adversely affect both the perception of 
the standards as legitimate and the actual quality of the standards 
themselves. Second, TRNs, like the Basel Committee, do not 
normally have a mechanism for reviewing any particular standard, 
outside of the TRN itself (meaning the TRN reviews its own work), 
which also may affect both the perception of legitimacy and the 
quality of the standards proposed. Third, TRNs do not normally have 
neutral or objective ways of monitoring compliance.35 These problems 
result in flaws in the standards that TRNs create and advance. 
These problems may be overcome with a combination of 
adequate procedural standards and substantive standards.36 Naturally, 
these procedural and substantive standards may be very difficult to 
implement in fact. A key problem is that the inherent conflicts among 
 
 31. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005). Professors Kingsbury, 
Krisch, and Stewart have developed a project on global administrative law at New York 
University that is part of the Regulatory Institutions Network, or “RegNet.”  
 32. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 115 (2009). 
 33. The Committee’s members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. About 
the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 34. Verdier, supra note 32, at 115. 
 35. Id. at 116. 
 36. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 31, at 17, 37–42. Procedural standards 
could include sufficient transparency in the adoption of rules, adequate participation by 
different state regulatory authorities, reasoned decision making, and effective review of 
final rules and decisions, while substantive standards could provide that any rules adopted 
are proportional and rational, employ the least restrictive means to accomplish the desired 
result, and satisfy legitimate expectations. 
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different national regulators must be resolved if the TRN is to agree 
upon one or more best practices. This will lead to concessions and 
tradeoffs, breaching some or all of the procedural or substantive 
standards.37 
C. Quasi-TRNs, Organizations with TRN Characteristics, and States 
Themselves 
This Article has so far addressed the paradigmatic TRN, like the 
Basel Committee. But, there may be other groups that have some, 
though not all, TRN characteristics. This Article proposes a 
taxonomy based on the characteristics of TRNs (and other networks 
of sub-state units) that distinguish them from states acting alone. 
Quasi-TRNs. The first category of groups possessing TRN 
characteristics includes quasi-TRNs, or those organizations like the 
Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) on Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Financing, that have most, but not all, TRN attributes.38 As 
with TRNs like the Basel Committee, the FATF has worked to create 
various standards and best practices. Also like the Basel Committee, 
the FATF has no legal personality and no formal system of internal 
governance. While it has a few staff, it relies primarily on the 
expertise of its members to conduct its work and it reaches agreement 
by consensus. Unlike the Basel Committee, the members of the 
FATF are states. However, as a practical matter, states’ members are 
represented at the FATF by sub-state units, including regulatory 
authorities (most particularly banking supervisors), as well as law 
enforcement. While the Basel Committee is less susceptible to state 
control than the FATF, it retains at least some of the beneficial 
qualities of serving as a repository of local expertise. 
Two types of international treaty organizations with TRN 
characteristics. The second category includes international treaty 
organizations, which this Article divides into two types: those with 
broad membership and those with more restricted membership. The 
former includes international financial institutions like the IMF, 
 
 37. See Verdier, supra note 32, at 115–16. 
 38. Anti-money laundering principles involve both regulatory and non-regulatory 
(mostly related to criminal justice) matters. See DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU ET AL., 
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 35 (1998), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wefs/toward/index.htm (follow link for Part VI, 
Prudential Regulation of Banking). For purposes of simplicity, this Article will refer to 
TRNs as including matters that are primarily regulatory in nature but that may involve 
some non-regulatory issues. It will also refer to regulatory issues as matters that may 
require some legislative response. 
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World Bank, or regional development banks. While these are 
accepted as parts of the traditional international legal system, they do 
share some characteristics of TRNs. Like the Basel Committee, the 
IMF has created some technical standards, although none in the 
traditional regulatory areas such as banking, securities, or insurance.39 
Unlike the Basel Committee or the Financial Action Task Force, 
however, the IMF is a treaty organization with state membership, 
with a large paid professional staff, and with a formal governance 
structure.40 However, states are represented at the IMF through their 
central banks or finance ministries, and the organization’s staff is 
selected largely because of its technical expertise, including in 
financial regulatory areas.41 While the organization itself is controlled 
by states, staff may still exercise its expertise with some significant 
freedom from the control of those states. 
Organizations like the IMF have non-TRN characteristics that 
address some of the problems that scholars have identified with 
TRNs. For example, unlike the Basel Committee, which has a 
membership limited to only a few national banking regulators, the 
IMF’s membership includes nearly every state,42 and its staff includes 
individuals from nearly every country in the world.43 Such broad 
membership may allay some legitimacy concerns. In addition, IMF 
staff might be able to review the standards proposed by TRNs or play 
a role in monitoring compliance. As will be discussed in Part III.A, 
these are key roles the IMF has played. 
The second type of international treaty organization is 
dominated by member states more than the first type of treaty 
organization with TRN characteristics, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).44 This type 
 
 39. See, e.g., IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board, http://dsbb.imf.org/ 
Applications/web/dsbbhome/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (noting that the special data 
dissemination standards provide guidance as to how countries should disseminate key 
economic and financial data). 
 40. Richard Gordon, The International Monetary Fund: A Mandate to Fight Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, in MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1093, 1093–95 (2d ed. 2007). 
 41. Id. 
 42. IMF, Membership, http://www.imf.org/external/about/members.htm (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2009). 
43.  IMF, THE ROLE OF DIVERSITY IN THE FUND’S HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY 
5–10 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2003/052803.pdf. 
44.  Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Ratification of the Convention of 
the OECD [hereinafter OECD, Ratification of the Convention], 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2009). 
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will obviously suffer from a number of problems in independence and 
legitimacy due to its domination by member states. However, even 
the OECD may exhibit some positive TRN characteristics; for 
example, the OECD and its members may also tap into significant 
domestic expertise in the fiscal area. 
States themselves. While TRNs may use soft power to convince 
national regulators as to what constitutes a standard or best practice, 
those regulators are the ones who may exercise hard power. The 
acceptance of the standard may be an exercise of soft power, but 
regulatory sanctions based on that standard are backed by the police 
power of the state itself. Regulatory power typically applies only to 
the resident of the state in which the regulator has jurisdiction, but 
applying such power to its resident can force the resident to stop 
doing business with states that have not applied the standard. This 
brings market pressure to bear on the non-complying state to comply. 
If states whose residents have significant market power are prevented 
from doing business with the non-complying state, market pressure 
on the non-complying state will be significant. Thus, the application 
of hard power is more effective if it is coordinated among states 
whose residents have a dominating market presence.45 Obviously, 
states acting as themselves embody many of the negative 
characteristics that TRNs are supposed to replace. Although they are 
far less associated with the creation and application of technical-
based and generally accepted standards, they can nevertheless play 
their roles in relatively more benign ways that do not conflict with the 
various goals of creating and implementing generally accepted 
standards as described above.46 
 
 45. Another reason that onshore jurisdictions sought a coordinated response may 
have been to prevent anyone from receiving a competitive advantage by using OFCs to 
escape domestic tax or regulatory costs. Once the OFC’s allegedly noxious activities were 
shut down, no one’s residents could benefit by using them. 
 46. Another category might include states acting together in informal clubs, such as 
the G-8
 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States), University of Toronto Munk Center for International Studies G-8 
Research Group, What is the G-8?, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2009), or the increasingly important G-20 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
Steve Brusk & Ed Henry, Officials: G-20 to Supplant G-8 as International Economic 
Council, CNN.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/09/24/us.g.twenty 
.summit/index.html. When acting in such groups, they often focus on particular technical 
issues rather than simply on natural law (i.e., principle) or positivism (i.e., state interests). 
Another possible category would be supra-national, quasi-federalist, multi-state polities 
like the European Union. Each of these additional categories lie somewhere between 
states themselves and organizations like the OECD. 
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D. The Resulting Standard 
TRNs, quasi-TRNs, international organizations with TRN 
characteristics, and states themselves operate in an interrelated 
fashion. They may not all come into play in every standard system or 
come into play in the same way with respect to every issue of global 
governance. Those that do, with respect to a particular regulatory 
issue, will bring along their different characteristics (along with their 
different pluses and minuses) to the process. Each will influence each 
other and, of course, the final result. However, the success or failure 
of these systems is likely to depend on the presence of beneficial or 
detrimental characteristics found in the TRNs, quasi-TRNs, 
international organizations with TRN characteristics, and states 
themselves. The more positive attributes there are and the fewer 
detrimental attributes there are, the more likely it will be that the 
resulting system will work, and work beneficially. 
II.  THE SYSTEM IN ACTION: OFCS AND INCOME TAXATION, 
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
A. Overview 
At its heart, the complaint that onshore jurisdictions had with 
offshore centers was that the latter provided a willing sanctuary for 
tax evasion, poor financial regulation, and money laundering by 
onshore residents.47 There was, however, no generally accepted 
international legal framework to address the causes of the alleged 
damages. 
Onshore centers, while conceding the costliness of the taxes and 
financial regulations they imposed on resident investors, nevertheless 
justified them as necessary to protect their citizens from the risks 
inherent in OFCs.48 OFCs, on the other hand, realized that by 
providing onshore residents with a means of avoiding these same 
taxes and regulations, they could obtain the financial benefits of 
handling the onshore residents’ business. Tax evasion, however, was 
not the only consequence suffered by onshore centers as a result of 
OFCs. By allowing onshore residents to circumvent prudential 
regulations, offshore financial centers threatened the safety and 
soundness of all financial systems. And, by allowing onshore residents 
to circumvent anti-money laundering (and later terrorism financing 
 
 47. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1, and D.1. 
 48. See infra Parts II.B.1, C.1, and D.1. 
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policies), OFCs were also enablers of both serious and often violent 
crime and terrorism both at home and abroad.49 
While the complaint against these three OFC behaviors 
developed over a more or less similar time period (from the late 1970s 
to the present), each did not develop exactly at the same time—and 
over the period in question they often had a different relative 
importance. 
B. Income Tax 
1.  The Basic Indictment50 
There is little question that, at least early on, most offshore 
centers (as well as some onshore centers)51 offered onshore residents 
 
 49. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 50. This short section is a summary and, in some cases, a reorganization of arguments 
on tax havens and harmful tax practices. The arguments began very early. The G-7 stated 
their concern over “[t]ax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically 
mobile activities [that] can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks 
of distorting trade and investment and [leading] to the erosion of national tax bases.” 
Lyon Summit Communiqué: Making a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE DISPATCH SUPPLEMENT para. 16 (June 1996), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_nSUPP-2_v7/ai_18777690. They were later 
developed by the OECD in Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. OECD, 
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 19–25 (1998) [hereinafter 
OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/ 
1904176.pdf. See generally Craig Boise, Regulating Tax Competition in Offshore Centers 
(Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266329 (providing an excellent in-
depth discussion of other arguments for and against tax havens).  
 51. There was an early recognition by the OECD that it was difficult to come up with 
an objective definition of a “tax haven.” OECD, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND 
EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES 20 (1987). However, the jurisdictions eventually 
identified by the OECD looked very much like the list of offshore jurisdictions compiled 
by the IMF, of problem jurisdictions compiled with respect to prudential regulation, and, 
to a lesser degree, anti-money laundering. Compare OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-
OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
17 (2000) [hereinafter OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION], 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf (citing thirty-five jurisdictions that meet 
the OECD tax haven criteria), with Luca Errico & Alberto Musalem, Offshore Banking: 
An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-Prudential Issues 10–11 (IMF, Working Paper No. 99/5, 
1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880532 (compiling a list of sixty-nine countries 
and territories that have offshore financial centers capable of being exploited for tax 
evasion and money laundering purposes), Press Release, Bank for International 
Settlements, Financial Stability Forum Releases Grouping of Offshore Financial Centers 
(OFCs) to Assist in Setting Priorities for Assessment (May 26, 2000) [hereinafter Press 
Release, Bank for International Settlements], available at http://www.bis.org/press/ 
p000526.htm (categorizing OFCs into three priority groups based on the quality of legal 
infrastructures and financial supervision provided by each jurisdiction), and FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING [FATF], FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY 
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an opportunity to evade taxes on income from capital by neither 
levying tax on income from non-resident capital investments nor 
reporting such income to resident countries. In effect, these offshore 
tax havens invited onshore taxpayers to shift their capital investments 
from onshore financial intermediaries to tax haven-based 
intermediaries. 
The vast majority of capital that flowed to tax havens was not 
invested locally in either fixed assets like buildings or equipment or in 
human assets like managers or workers. Tax havens and their 
economies were quite small and needed only a tiny fraction of the 
capital that flowed to them for local investment. Instead, the capital 
was routed to other locations where it could be invested in actual 
productive assets. The role of the tax haven was to act as a conduit or 
entrepôt on the way to another destination.52 
The tax haven provided a place where, as a technical legal 
matter, income accumulated or where payments were made, while the 
actual management could be undertaken somewhere else and the 
actual capital was invested in real productive assets somewhere else. 
The tax haven mainly provided services like a tax-free environment 
and secrecy,53 although freedom from non-tax regulation and 
dependable legal systems were also beneficial to such investors.54 
In one very simple example, a person subject to residence 
taxation would open a bank account in the tax haven. Third party 
payments to the taxpayer would then be diverted to the tax haven 
bank account. The tax haven would not tax interest income; nor 
would the taxpayer voluntarily pay tax to the resident jurisdiction on 
that interest.55 The ability of the taxpayer to evade taxes would be 
greatly reduced if the bank were required to report interest income to 
 
NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 2–10 (June 22, 2000), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf (providing a list of jurisdictions the 
FATF deems to be “non-cooperative” with detrimental financial practices). 
 52. See RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES 
TAXPAYERS—AN OVERVIEW 32–41 (1981) [hereinafter GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND 
THEIR USE], available at http://www.archive.org/details/taxhavenstheirus01gord.  
53. Id. at 15, 17.  
 54. Id. at 22–23. 
 55. Richard A. Gordon did not discuss this issue in his report, TAX HAVENS AND 
THEIR USE, supra note 52, but the point had long been made elsewhere and was therefore 
already widely known. Also, the amount of evasion involved was considered trivial 
compared to the use of companies and other offshore vehicles for tax evasion. Telephone 
Interview with David Brockway, Esq., former Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, 
U.S. Congress 1983–86 (October 15, 2009). Gordon does discuss a related issue in the 
context of earnings by companies and other vehicles. See discussion infra. 
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the tax authority.56 Such reporting requirements are a key feature of 
most income tax administrations.57 
In the event that the payments diverted to the account in the tax 
haven constituted income, the taxpayer could also fail to declare 
those as income.58 The ability of the taxpayer to evade taxes in this 
case would be greatly reduced if third party payers were required to 
report payments and banks were required to report the beneficial 
ownership of the bank account to the tax authorities.59 
A taxpayer could also set up a company or a trust in the tax 
haven and direct payments to that company’s bank account rather 
than to his own. Profits accruing to the company or other legal form 
could then escape tax in both the tax haven and country of the 
taxpayer. As a general rule, the U.S. tax regime only taxed dividends 
paid by a foreign company to a U.S. resident and not the earnings of 
that company. However, to prevent tax avoidance, rules were 
adopted to tax, in certain circumstances, the U.S. resident’s share of 
the earnings of such a company when the earnings constituted passive 
investment income, meaning essentially that the income from the 
asset could have been paid directly to the U.S. resident without going 
first through the foreign company.60 But without adequate 
information provided by the tax haven, the Internal Revenue Service 
would have no way of knowing such income was taxable.61 Of course, 
the U.S. resident could also interpose companies between herself and 
her tax haven bank account to engage in other forms of tax evasion, 
 
 56. For example, in the United States, interest paid by a U.S. resident must be 
reported by the payor to the Internal Revenue Service. I.R.C. § 6049 (2006). 
 57. Richard K. Gordon, Jnr., Income Tax Compliance and Sanctions in Developing 
Countries, in TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 455, 460–61 (Richard M. Bird & 
Oliver Oldman eds., 4th ed. 1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Income Tax Compliance]; Richard 
K. Gordon, Law of Tax Administration and Procedure, in TAX LAW DESIGN AND 
DRAFTING 95, 103 (Victor Thuronyi ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2000) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Law of Tax Administration and Procedure]. 
 58. Again, Richard A. Gordon did not discuss this issue in his report TAX HAVENS 
AND THEIR USE, supra note 52. He does discuss a related issue in the context of payments 
to companies and other vehicles. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 59. For example, in the United States, many payments representing income must be 
reported by the resident payor to the Internal Revenue Service, including dividends (I.R.C 
§ 6042 (2006)), returns of brokers (§ 6045), interest (§ 6049), unemployment compensation 
(§ 6050B), royalties (§ 6050N), and wages (§ 6051(d)). 
 60. See GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52, at 24–25, 50–58.  
 61. See id. at 8–9, 180–82.  
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such as directing payments constituting would-be taxpayer income to 
the company instead, as well as other techniques.62 
In the absence of adequate information to determine whether a 
domestic payment to a tax haven-based recipient had in fact come 
from a domestic taxpayer, the domestic jurisdiction could instead levy 
a gross fee on that payment approximating the amount that would be 
due. Levying gross withholding taxes on payments in lieu of taxing 
recipients is an important tax administration tool.63 In fact, primarily 
for ease of tax administration, the generally accepted international 
tax regime has long assumed that certain payments to foreigners that 
usually represent income to the recipient would be taxed at a gross 
rate by the jurisdiction of the payer. These would include interest, 
dividends, royalties, and wages.64 Possible double taxation of the same 
income was eliminated by the receiving jurisdiction by not taxing the 
foreign income (which is what tax havens did) or by taxing it but 
giving a credit for the taxes remitted (the general rule and the one 
adopted by the United States),65 or by reducing or eliminating the 
gross tax through a tax treaty (and/or combining this with the 
exemption or credit system).66 Of course, going the third route means 
re-opening the tax evasion problem—which is why the system would 
need enough flow of information to ensure that the paying 
jurisdiction could tax its residents who were receiving income through 
the bank account or company or other legal form in the receiving 
country. This is why the standard-form tax treaties have had articles 
on exchange of information, which allows one treaty partner to 
request and receive key information from the other.67 
As it turned out, by the 1970s, the United States had a large 
network of tax treaties reducing or eliminating these gross taxes on 
 
 62. See id. at 26–28, 59–127. Gordon directs the lion’s share of attention in his report 
to these issues, presumably because they constituted the lion’s share of revenue losses. See 
id. 
 63. See Gordon, Income Tax Compliance, supra note 57, at 460–61; Gordon, Law of 
Tax Administration and Procedure, supra note 57, at 103, 115. 
 64. Richard J. Vann, International Aspects of Income Tax, in TAX LAW DESIGN AND 
DRAFTING, supra note 57, at 718, 721–22, 762–68.  
 65. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 
157 (2003).  
 66. Vann, supra note 64, at 718, 758–59. In 1981, the United States Model Income Tax 
Treaty posited that the rate of tax on dividends should be reduced from 30 percent to 5 
percent in the case of direct investment (ownership of 10 percent or more of the stock of 
the payor corporation) and to 15 percent in the case of portfolio investment. Interest and 
royalties should be exempt from gross tax. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, 
supra note 52, at 148. 
 67. Vann, supra note 64, at 804–07.  
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payments from U.S. persons to bank accounts in tax havens, but these 
treaties lacked effective exchange-of-information provisions.68 Some 
of the reasons for having such treaties were historical, based on 
earlier treaties with the United Kingdom that extended benefits to 
former U.K. colonies that were now tax havens.69 The treaty with the 
Netherland Antilles, oddly, was tolerated so that overseas investors 
could invest in the U.S. corporate debt market without having to pay 
gross tax to the United States,70 thereby helping them to evade tax in 
their home jurisdiction.71 
2.  The System in Action 
Serious concern over the use of tax havens by U.S. citizens began 
in 1979 when the Oversight Subcommittee of the U.S. House Ways 
and Means Committee held hearings focused primarily on Caribbean 
OFCs.72 Two years later, Richard A. Gordon completed a report for 
the U.S. Treasury entitled Tax Havens and Their Use by United States 
Taxpayers.73 In the three years following the publication of the 
Gordon Report, the U.S. Congress held a series of additional 
hearings on tax haven “abuse” (which also included a short discussion 
of tax havens’ role in money laundering).74 The U.S. Treasury focused 
on preventing tax haven abuse thorough the exchange of taxpayer 
information. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, which provided economic 
benefits to jurisdictions (many of which were offshore centers) that 
 
 68. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52, at 147–49, 207–09.  
 69. Id. at 149. 
 70. Id. at 149–50. 
 71. Personal communication from a Senate confirmation-level U.S. Treasury official, 
to author (Oct. 18, 1994).  
 72. The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of Evading Income Taxes: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th 
Cong. 284–99 (1979). These hearings and subsequent developments are discussed in Bruce 
Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too 
Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 333–35 (2003).  
 73. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE, supra note 52.  
 74. See generally Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing 
Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations, 97th Cong. (1982) (discussing measures to stop the illegal use of foreign 
addresses to evade U.S. taxes); Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands Antilles and Other 
Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
98th Cong. 3 (1983) (focusing on money laundering through the Netherlands Antilles and 
other Caribbean tax haven territories); Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and 
Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. 
on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong. 16, 21 (1983) (studying the use of offshore tax 
shelters to evade U.S. taxes). See Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–35, for a discussion of the 
chronology of the three hearings. 
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agreed to an information-exchange agreement with the United 
States.75 More importantly, in 1984, the Tax Reform Act authorized 
the government to deny a general exemption of withholding tax on 
portfolio interest paid to any person within a jurisdiction that did not 
provide the United States sufficient information to prevent evasion of 
U.S. income tax by U.S. persons.76 In addition, the United States 
refused to enter into new tax treaties with jurisdictions that did not 
include exchange-of-information agreements.77 
While some progress was made in information-exchange 
agreements over the next ten years, most of the key offshore centers 
did not sign on.78 In addition, some offshore centers that did agree to 
enter into information-exchange agreements were less than 
forthcoming in implementing those agreements.79 Also, there was a 
fundamental problem with relying solely on requests for information 
on particular U.S. taxpayers to prevent U.S. persons in general from 
using a tax haven to avoid U.S. taxes: the U.S. tax authorities would 
not, ab initio, know what information to request. Presumably, it 
would be far better from the U.S. point of view if tax havens charged 
a positive rate of tax and/or if they made it more difficult for U.S. 
taxpayers using the tax haven as a “residence” to hide the fact that 
they were in fact U.S. persons. 
There were good reasons why offshore centers neither levied 
income taxes on U.S. residents nor frequently on their own residents. 
First, because offshore centers were essentially transit points for 
capital flowing from one onshore jurisdiction to another, little or no 
income on that capital had an economic source in the offshore center 
itself.80 This meant that there were good theoretical reasons not to tax 
 
 75. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384, 
395–97 (1983). The Act created I.R.C. § 274(h)(6) to allow tax deductions for conventions 
in Caribbean countries if those countries entered into exchange-of-information 
agreements with the United States; see also Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–35 (providing a 
summary of the Act). See generally Gregory P. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax 
Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20 INT’L L. 1209 (1986) (discussing how the U.S. 
Treasury uses information gathering through both treaty and non-treaty means to combat 
tax avoidance and evasion in tax haven countries).  
 76. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 648–50 (1984). 
The new I.R.C. § 871(h)(1) repealed the withholding tax on certain portfolio debt 
investments of non-residents, while § 871(h)(5) allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to 
provide that the repeal does not apply in cases of inadequate information exchange. 
 77. A review of all U.S. tax treaties concluded since 1984 shows that all have 
exchange-of-information agreements. 
 78. See Zagaris, supra note 72, at 332–37. 
 79. See id. at 335–36. 
 80. See discussion supra at Part II.B.1. 
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flows of income from capital in the offshore center.81 Next, because 
the vast majority of offshore centers were quite small and produced 
few goods domestically (many were islands with little or no domestic 
industry), most goods were imported.82 Many of these jurisdictions 
may simply have concluded that it was administratively easier to raise 
needed government revenue through taxes levied on imports than 
taxes levied on income.83 There were also reasons based in economic 
theory to conclude that indirect taxes were preferable to income 
taxes. In fact, there was already a general consensus among many 
economists that taxes on income from capital were undesirable due to 
the disincentive effects on savings.84 There were also good reasons 
why offshore centers may not have wished to act as reporting agents 
for the U.S. tax authorities. Such reporting would be expensive, 
particularly given that most offshore centers had no income tax 
themselves and, therefore, had no pre-existing infrastructure for 
reporting.85 Finally, implementing an income tax and/or reporting 
income earned by non-residents to their tax authority would have the 
effect of benefiting foreign jurisdictions without creating a domestic 
benefit; in fact, the costs born locally, including the loss of business, 
might be considerable.86 
Throughout the 1980s, the United States raised the problem of 
tax haven abuse with other major onshore jurisdictions, a number of 
which also expressed considerable concern, especially France and, to 
 
 81. Officials from a number of offshore centers argued to IMF staff members that 
because they were neither source nor resident jurisdictions, they had no reason to tax cash 
flows “passing through us.” For an overview of international tax theory, see generally 
GRAETZ, supra note 65 (describing the economic and administrative foundations for 
taxation of income in source and residence jurisdictions). 
 82. Id. at 378, 390; see Boise, supra note 50, at 24.  
 83. Boise, supra note 50, at 25 (discussing how the relatively small size and geographic 
isolation of OFCs combine to make an income tax a highly inefficient means of obtaining 
revenue in comparison to duties on imports). 
 84. See, e.g., Andrew Atkeson et al., Capital Income Taxes; A Bad Idea, 23 FED. RES. 
BANK MINN. Q. REV. 1, 11 (1999), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/ 
QR/QR2331.pdf (concluding that recent research suggests that capital income should not 
be taxed, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary). There are many other reasons for 
favoring an income tax, including the ability to tax wealthy persons, who have less 
marginal utility in each additional currency unit earned, at higher effective rates than less 
wealthy persons. See Carl S. Shoup, Taxes and Economic Development, 25 
FINANZARCHIV 385, 388 (1966). 
 85. Boise, supra note 50, at 25. 
 86. Personal communication from Robert Mathavious, Managing Dir., Fin. Services 
Comm’n of the British Virgin Islands, in Roadtown, British Virgin Islands, to author 
(Aug. 16, 2004). 
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a lesser extent, Germany and the United Kingdom.87 During this 
period, representatives of these countries also raised the issue at 
meetings of the G-7 (and later G-8, following the addition of the 
Russian Federation).88 
The larger onshore jurisdictions then turned to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD is an 
international organization created by treaty that limits membership 
(largely) to developed countries.89 While membership has been 
increasing, at the time it included the European Union members plus 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States, Canada, Japan, and 
Turkey.90 The purposes of the OECD, as expressed in its founding 
convention, included the promotion of policies designed to achieve 
economic growth and fiscal stability;91 the OECD’s primary role was 
to carry out relevant studies and act as a forum where members could 
“co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-ordinated 
action.”92 Much of the OECD’s prior work involving taxation focused 
on developing model double-taxation conventions, including a draft 
convention on exchange of taxpayer information.93 Once formed, the 
United States called on the OECD to study the effect of tax havens.94 
As discussed above in Part I.C, the OECD displayed some TRN-
like characteristics; for example, it could call on a great deal of 
expertise in the tax area from among its members. But, it failed as a 
TRN on many fronts. The OECD consisted of states themselves, 
meaning governments and not the regulatory agencies of states 
comprised its membership.95 In other words, it was under the political 
control of states. At the same time, it suffered from many of the 
 
 87. Personal communication from David H. Brockway, Esq., Chief of Staff, Joint 
Comm. on Taxation, U.S. Congress 1983–86, in Washington, D.C., to author (June 12, 
1989). U.K. loyalties were somewhat divided, in that a significant number of the tax 
havens were also overseas territories of the United Kingdom. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention, supra note 44.  
 90. See id. 
 91. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
arts. 1, 2, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179, available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 92. Id. art. 3(c). 
 93. OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 9–15 (2008) [hereinafter OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL 
AFFAIRS], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/41147804.pdf. 
 94. Personal communication from Jeffrey Owen, Former Dir. of the Dep’t of Fiscal 
Affairs, OECD, in Paris, Fr., to author (May 23, 2003).  
 95. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention, supra note 44.  
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drawbacks of such TRNs as the Basel Committee; it was dominated 
by a relatively small number of wealthy jurisdictions.96 
In 1987, the OECD published a key study on tax havens that, in 
many ways, mirrored the conclusions of the Gordon Report.97 The 
OECD study, prepared by staff from member treasury departments 
and finance ministries (and with participation of outside consultants), 
also focused on the importance of exchange of information, especially 
with respect to bank records, and the problems of shell companies 
whose beneficial owner and controller could not be easily identified.98 
The study proposed that tax treaty benefits not be extended to 
jurisdictions that did not provide adequate information exchange, as 
well as other countermeasures reminiscent of those proposed in the 
United States in 1984.99 
Beginning in the mid-1980s (but continuing through the 1990s), 
the larger onshore jurisdictions attempted to involve the IMF in 
analyzing and criticizing offshore center income tax policies. Also, as 
discussed in Part I.C, the IMF had some of the advantages, and 
avoided some of the disadvantages, of TRNs.100 While its membership 
consisted of states, it had a skilled and independent professional civil 
service as a member which could, at least in theory, bring relatively 
unbiased technical skills to bear on problems. And unlike TRNs like 
the Basel Committee or the OECD, its membership was nearly 
universal.101 
There were good reasons for the onshore jurisdictions to wish for 
IMF involvement. It appeared to have jurisdiction; under the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement,102 members are obligated to direct their 
“economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering 
 
 96. The author attended many meetings of various committees of the OECD as well 
as conferences sponsored by the OECD from 1990 to 2002. This is his personal conclusion 
based on hundreds of hours of conversations with OECD staff and ambassadors to the 
OECD. 
 97. OECD, INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED 
STUDIES, supra note 51. 
 98. Id. at 45–46 (noting, incidentally, that this “lack of transparency” also created 
opportunities for money laundering). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See the discussion in Part I.C supra concerning the IMF’s TRN-like 
characteristics. 
 101. See IMF, Membership, supra note 42.  
 102. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended by the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement 
of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 15 I.L.M. 546) 
[hereinafter IMF Articles]. The current text of the treaty is available from the IMF Web 
site at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.  
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orderly economic growth” and underlying economic and financial 
conditions, which would certainly include tax matters.103 The Articles 
also give the IMF influence and even power. The IMF has the 
jurisdiction to exercise surveillance over these policies,104 which they 
do by writing and discussing (mostly) annual reports on each 
member’s economy, meaning they could criticize a member’s tax 
policies.105 The Articles also allow the Fund to provide financial 
assistance to member countries in certain circumstances, including 
that the borrowers follow conditions laid down by the Fund.106 Those 
conditions might include changing tax policy. Finally, the Articles 
allow the Fund to provide technical assistance to members (and 
others), provided that the assistance is consistent with the purposes of 
the Fund; in other words, they could help draft tax laws.107 
The Fund, in fact, has a long tradition of attending to tax matters 
when conducting surveillance, designing conditions for the use of 
Fund financial resources, and providing technical assistance.108 Not 
surprisingly, onshore jurisdictions intimated that they would like the 
Fund to support anti-tax haven activities through its surveillance, 
conditionality, and technical assistance.109 
 However, with respect to surveillance and conditionality, the 
IMF (meaning the Executive Board, management, and staff) 
concluded that its jurisdiction lay uniquely in how a particular 
member’s110 tax policies affected its own economic and fiscal well-
being. The issue of the effects of a member’s tax policies on the 
 
 103. Id. art. IV, § 1(i).  
 104. Id. art. IV, § 3. See generally Gordon, supra note 40, at 1096–98 (providing an 
overview of the IMF’s mandate, organization, and activities). 
 105. See IMF Surveillance, A Factsheet (June 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
exr/facts/surv.htm. 
 106. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. V, § 3; see also IMF, IMF Conditionality, A 
Factsheet (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm 
(describing the conditions of the IMF’s lending program). 
 107. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. V, § 2; see also IMF, IMF Technical 
Assistance, A Factsheet (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm 
(detailing the technical assistance provided by the IMF). 
 108. There is an enormous amount of material on the Fund’s activities with respect to 
each of these three areas of activity. Surveillance reports, country reports on the use of 
Fund resources (including reviews of country performance resulting in disbursement of 
funds to the borrowing member), and reports on Fund technical assistance are now 
available on the Fund’s Web site, http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm. 
 109. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities 
of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period. 
 110. All but five offshore centers (Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Tuvalu, and 
Nauru) are either members of the IMF directly or as an overseas territory, dependency, 
special administrative area, etc. of a member. 
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economic or fiscal well-being of other members should not be within 
its jurisdiction, argued François Gianviti, General Counsel and 
Director of the Legal Department from January 1986 to December 
2004.111 With respect to tax technical assistance, which at the time was 
strictly voluntary, the question of external implications of domestic 
tax policy was generally not raised by IMF staff. Had it been, the 
effects of such voluntary Fund-to-jurisdiction advice on curbing 
OFCs’ so-called harmful tax practices would still have been, at best, 
trivial.112 
There are a number of reasons why the Fund as an institution 
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to become involved in the 
Harmful Tax Practices Project. Although the actual evidence is 
sketchy and largely anecdotal, it appears that the political concerns of 
a number of key Executive Board members were important—though 
probably not determinative. The IMF Board consists of twenty-four 
members. The five IMF members with the greatest voting power, the 
United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France,113 
select an Executive Board member directly, while other IMF 
members elect Board members from self-organized constituencies.114 
The United Kingdom was one of the onshore jurisdictions expressing 
concern over the harmful tax practices of offshore centers, albeit with 
less energy and conviction than the United States or France.115 As 
such, the United Kingdom was primarily representing the concerns of 
the U.K. Treasury. However, at the IMF, the United Kingdom also 
represents the interests of the British Overseas Territories and Crown 
Dependencies because they are, for Fund purposes, part of the 
United Kingdom.116 Of these, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin 
 
 111. The author drafted a legal opinion which reached this conclusion. While it was 
endorsed by the General Counsel, it was not publically released. 
 112. During the early 1990s, Vito Tanzi, the then head of the Fiscal Affairs 
Department, began to criticize the adverse effects that tax havens had on tax systems of 
other countries and speculated that those countries could force a change in the tax policies 
of tax havens by a concerted levying of significant withholding tax on all payments to such 
havens and levying significant tax on all payments from them. However, such a critique 
was not integrated into the Fund’s surveillance or conditionality. See Vito Tanzi, 
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Future of Tax Systems (IMF, Working Paper No. 
96/141, 1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=883038. 
 113. IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. XII, § 3; IMF, IMF Executive Directors and 
Voting Power [hereinafter IMF, Executive Directors], http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/ 
memdir/eds.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
 114. See IMF, Executive Directors, supra note 113. 
 115. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities 
of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period. 
 116. Membership is restricted to countries. See IMF Articles, supra note 102, art. II; 
IMF, Membership, supra note 42. The IMF’s and United Kingdom’s recognition of British 
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Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands were offshore centers 
that were allegedly engaging in harmful tax practices.117 These U.K. 
territories and dependencies had jurisdiction over their own domestic 
tax policies—they were not under the control of the U.K. Treasury.118 
This appeared to at least some IMF staff to create a tension between 
the United Kingdom’s more limited domestic interests, as expressed 
through their concern over harmful tax practices, and the United 
Kingdom’s broader “imperial” interests, as expressed through their 
need to represent the interests of overseas territories and crown 
dependencies at the IMF. 
Another member of the IMF Board with divided loyalties was 
Canada. Canada, a G-7 member country since 1976, led an elective 
IMF Executive Board constituency that included the independent 
Commonwealth countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines,119 each of which was also an offshore 
financial center with “suspect” tax practices.120 The Canadian 
Executive Director (who also represented Ireland and Jamaica) was 
well known to many IMF staff for actively representing the interests 
of the members of its constituency. In other words, the fact that the 
IMF’s membership was broadly inclusive (unlike the OECD) was 
probably one reason it did not get involved in curbing tax practices of 
offshore centers. 
Also important was the view of the IMF management and staff, 
as articulated by the Legal Department in a number of unpublished 
memoranda, that there was nothing in the IMF Articles of 
Agreement that created any membership obligation that a member 
take action to benefit another member at their own expense.121 This 
would mean that jurisdictions engaging in allegedly harmful tax 
practices would only be counseled to adjust those practices if they 
 
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies as part of the United Kingdom for 
purposes of IMF membership is long standing. These facts were made clear to the author 
while he served as Senior Council in the Legal Department from 1996–2002. For a list of 
British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, see Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (U.K.), Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, http://collections 
.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=Ope
nMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1044360168291 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
 117. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17, 29. 
 118. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Briefing to IMF Staff in Washington, D.C. 
(Summer 2000). 
 119. IMF, Executive Directors, supra note 113.  
 120. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17. 
 121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
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were harmful to the jurisdiction itself rather than to other members. 
As this was not the problem, the Fund could not be expected to 
conclude that the choice of offshore jurisdictions to adopt domestic 
tax policies that caused harm to other members (by undermining the 
income tax base of other jurisdictions) breached some kind of Fund 
obligation. This principle of “no obligation to sacrifice for another 
member” applied particularly well for tax matters, in that there was 
no other international law that recognized any principle of 
international tax comity, i.e., that the courts (and administrative 
agencies) of one country should enforce the revenue laws of another 
country except on the basis of reciprocity. In other words, it was 
probably restraints on the organization’s ability to act on behalf of its 
wealthiest members (both its organizing principles and its 
independent staff) that helped keep the IMF from acting against the 
interests of the OFCs. 
Following the election of President Bill Clinton and the 
reappointment of Donald Lubick to the position of Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,122 the United States began to 
advance a more aggressive policy to moderate so-called harmful tax 
practices.123 Concluding that a coordinated approach would be more 
effective, the United States and France in particular worked with the 
remaining five members of the G-7 to mobilize the OECD to 
“develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax 
competition on investment and financing decisions and the 
consequences for national tax bases” and report back to the G-7 in 
1998.124 
A problem with such a coordinated approach was that a number 
of OECD jurisdictions were themselves offshore centers guilty of the 
same behavior. For example, most IMF staff appeared to consider 
Luxembourg and Switzerland, who had low or no tax on income from 
capital and relatively strict bank secrecy, offshore centers.125 
Nevertheless, the OECD as an organization duly issued a report 
 
 122. Assistant Secretary Lubick held the same position under President Jimmy Carter. 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Donald C. Lubick Confirmed as Treasury 
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
press/releases/rr2225.htm. 
 123. Personal communication from Donald Lubick, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for 
Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, in Washington, D.C., to author (Summer 1994).  
 124. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 7 (quoting the 
Ministerial Communiqué of May 1996). 
 125. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities 
of the IMF during the relevant time period. 
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entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.126 
Among other things, the report called for the OECD to develop a list 
of uncooperative tax havens and “a number of Recommendations for 
action at the level of national legislation and in tax treaties.”127 The 
report also noted that “[c]ountries should remain free to design their 
own tax systems as long as they abide by internationally accepted 
standards in doing so,”128 later noting that while there was nothing 
inherently wrong with countries “that are able to finance their public 
services with no or nominal income taxes,”129 those that “offer 
themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape [income] 
tax in their country of residence” were in breach of accepted 
standards of behavior.130 Nevertheless, in identifying “harmful 
preferential tax regimes,” meaning breaches of accepted standards, 
the report listed a number of “key factors”: (1) the regime imposes 
low or no taxes on the relevant income (from geographically mobile 
financial and other service activities); (2) the regime is “ring-fenced” 
from the domestic economy (meaning that there is a domestic income 
tax, but that non-resident taxpayers are exempt from paying income 
tax); (3) the regime lacks transparency (e.g., the details of the regime 
or its application are not apparent or there is inadequate regulatory 
supervision or financial disclosure); and finally (4) there is no 
effective exchange of information with respect to the regime.131 
The report discussed how many OECD members had some 
aspects of harmful preferential regimes and produced a proposal for 
 
126.  OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 1. At their 1997 
meetings, the G-8 reaffirmed the importance of combating harmful tax competition. 
FINANCE MINISTERS’ REPORT, DENVER ECONOMIC SUMMIT (June 1997), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/summit/finance97.html. Soon after, the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs created the “Special Sessions on Tax Competition” in 
response to the ministerial communiqué. The Special Sessions prepared the report under 
the joint chairmanship of France and Japan. The Committee adopted the report at its 
session on the 20th of January, 1998. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra 
note 50, at 7. 
 127. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 50. 
 128. Id. at 15. 
 129. Id. at 20. At the time of the drafting of the report there was much discussion about 
how the success of the modern welfare state depended on effective taxation of income 
from capital, and that tax havens, by permitting avoidance or evasion of that tax, were 
therefore endangering the welfare state. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1573 (2000) (arguing that tax havens allow large amounts of income from capital to 
go untaxed, depriving countries of revenue and forcing them to rely on forms of taxation 
less progressive than the income tax, threatening the welfare state). 
 130. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 20. 
 131. Id. at 21. 
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dealing with these members.132 It also recommended creating a 
separate list of possible “tax havens.”133 When the list came out in the 
2000 OECD report Toward Global Tax Co-operation, no OECD 
members were on the list.134 Not surprisingly, due to the fact that 
OECD members would not be subject to the harmful tax practices, 
the project became a major criticism by project opponents.135 Simply 
put, the standards were not designed to be universal. The OECD was 
acting even less like a traditional TRN.136 
But a key problem for the OECD was identifying internationally 
accepted standards of income tax behavior. As the report correctly 
noted, there was no generally accepted standard that countries 
impose an income tax, or more specifically, a tax on income from 
capital.137 As argued earlier by at least some officials from OFCs, it 
was problematic to argue that jurisdictions should be compelled to 
enforce a tax on the income from capital of their non-residents, 
especially given no international standard and no international rule of 
tax comity.138 This was the main purpose of TRNs in the first place. 
The OECD’s 2000 report appeared to accept some of the 
arguments raised against the Harmful Tax Practices Project; while the 
report restated the four “key factors,” it noted at the beginning that 
the project was “not primarily about collecting taxes” or “promot[ing] 
the harmonisation of income taxes” or “dictating to any country what 
should be the appropriate level of tax rates.”139 Instead, “the project is 
about ensuring that the burden of taxation is fairly shared and that 
tax should not be the dominant factor in making capital allocation 
 
 132. Id. at 70–71.  
 133. Id. at 71. 
 134. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 17.  
 135. See J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX 
REGULATION 44–45 (2006). 
 136. During the 1990s, the European Union also began the process of addressing the 
more specific problem of tax evasion on savings income when an individual resident of one 
E.U. member country held an account in a financial institution in another E.U. member 
country whose tax authority did not withhold tax on interest paid to the non-resident or 
report the payment of that interest to the resident jurisdiction’s tax authority. See generally 
Thomas Perrot, Legislative Development: EC Draft Directive on the Taxation of Savings: 
Still a Long (and Bumpy) Road Ahead, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 475 (2003) (setting the 
Directive’s objective to deter tax avoidance); Suzanne Walsh, Taxation of Cross-Border 
Interest Flows: The Promises and Failures of the European Union Approach, 37 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005) (discussing the steps developed nations are taking to 
combat the threat of tax evasion created by “the increased mobility of capital”). 
 137. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 16. 
 138. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities 
of the IMF during the relevant time period. 
 139. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 5. 
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decisions . . . . The project will, by promoting a co-operative 
framework, support the effective fiscal sovereignty of countries over 
the design of their tax systems.”140 
There are many obvious problems and contradictions in this 
short statement. The project apparently is about collecting taxes in 
cases where there is no harmonization of tax rates; tax havens, by 
making it possible to reduce or eliminate tax on income from capital 
regardless of where the investment is actually located, actually ensure 
that tax is no factor in making capital allocation decisions; and 
effective implementation of the project will (they hope) result in 
offshore centers and other tax havens changing the design of their tax 
systems. One can almost pity the OECD. They outline the ideological 
reason why there is no generally accepted standard, then pretend that 
they have one that works. This is hardly the way a successful TRN is 
supposed to work. 
Finally, the report also compiled a preliminary list of tax havens 
from which a list of “uncooperative” tax havens was to be distilled 
over the next twelve months.141 The report concluded that in order to 
avoid inclusion on the list of “Uncooperative Tax Havens,” the 
jurisdiction would have to make a public political commitment to 
adopt a schedule of progressive changes to eliminate its harmful tax 
practices (i.e., the four key factors) by the end of 2005.142 The OECD 
also laid out a plan for dialogue with so-called “cooperative” 
jurisdictions.143 
While the 2000 Report retained the same extensive definition of 
harmful tax practices,144 that same year, the OECD released another 
report focusing in particular on the importance of the exchange of 
information, especially with respect to gathering information on bank 
accounts.145 As discussed above in Part II.B.1, with effective 
exchanges of information in cases of suspected tax evasion, onshore 
tax authorities could request and receive information from offshore 
jurisdictions about bank accounts and other information held by 
those specific taxpayers.146 However, those authorities would first 
have to identify particular taxpayers as possible evaders and fulfill 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 17–18. 
 142. Id. at 17–19. 
 143. Id. at 20–21. 
 144. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 51, at 9. 
 145. See OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES 
(2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/7/2497487.pdf. 
 146. See supra notes 57–58, 60, 62, and 68, and accompanying text. 
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domestic legal requirements for requesting such information.147 Even 
if they did, they often would not know what information to request.148 
While far better than nothing, just agreeing to exchanges of 
information would not solve the problems raised by onshore 
jurisdictions. Indeed, that was why the attributes of uncooperative 
jurisdictions went beyond exchange-of-information agreements. 
It was also around this time that the Financial Stability Forum 
(another quasi-TRN, to be discussed at greater length below in Part 
II.C.2) released its Group III list of jurisdictions that had the most 
problematic financial supervisory systems.149 The list included twenty-
five offshore centers, including nearly all those on the OECD tax 
haven list.150 
Not long after the release of the Report, then U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury, Lawrence Summers, tried once again to get the IMF 
involved. He issued a statement to the International Monetary and 
Finance Committee of the IMF calling “abuse of the global financial 
system” a “global public bad” and calling on the IMF and the World 
Bank to prepare a joint report on their roles in protecting the 
integrity of the financial system against abuse.151 He issued the 
statement as the IMF was implementing its Financial Sector 
Assessment Program and Offshore Financial Center Assessment 
Program.152 Some IMF senior staff involved assumed that the 
statement might have been directed, at least in part, toward the 
possibility of including harmful tax practices as a subject for 
assessment under those two programs.153 
While Secretary Summers specifically mentioned money 
laundering in his statement, staff prepared a background paper 
examining financial system abuse as broadly defined, including tax 
 
 147. OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, supra 
note 145, at 8–9, 19.  
 148. “As noted, the OECD’s proposed solution has been bilateral tax information 
exchange agreements requiring exchange of information on request, . . . which is not 
effective exchange of information.” David Spencer, Liechtenstein and the Subprime Crisis: 
Systemic Issues, J. INT’L TAX’N, Sept. 2008, at 14, 21. For a discussion of the different types 
of tax evasion opportunities that remain, see generally David Spencer and J.C. Sharman, 
International Tax Cooperation, J. INT’L TAX’N, Dec. 2007, at 34, 35–49. 
 149. See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, supra note 51. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement to the International 
Monetary and Finance Committee (Sept. 24, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/am/2000/imfc/eng/usa.htm. 
 152. These issues will be discussed at greater length infra in Parts II.C and D. 
 153. The author was a party to these discussions. Due to sensitivities involved, names 
and titles of discussants in this section are withheld. 
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evasion.154 The paper also discussed the OECD’s Harmful Tax 
Practices Project and its progress.155 A number of IMF Executive 
Directors spoke with IMF Management and the staff involved in 
drafting the background paper and made it clear that they opposed 
any IMF involvement in the Harmful Tax Practices Project, in part 
because the Fund should not be involved in any program that was not 
“voluntary” or that was “coercive,”156 which, incidentally, are 
concepts largely contrary to the way in which TRNs are supposed to 
operate.157 The next staff paper (co-authored with World Bank staff) 
deleted any discussion of harmful tax practices and focused 
exclusively on money laundering.158 
The next OECD report, released in early 2001, included a list of 
uncooperative jurisdictions (to be updated by the OECD) for the 
purpose of coordinating the application of the so-called “defensive 
measures.”159 They were actually quite straightforward. They would 
disallow normally available deductions, exemptions, allowances, and 
credits, as well as apply withholding taxes and increase audits, relating 
to transactions with residents or entities in the uncooperative 
jurisdictions.160 
While roundly described as the exercise of hard power sanctions 
and criticized as an improper application of financial force by the 
powerful against the weak,161 what the OECD termed 
“countermeasures” turned out to be primarily an exercise of purely 
domestic sovereignty by OECD members; in fact, the kinds of 
activities that members of TRNs, meaning domestic regulatory 
authorities, frequently undertake. This is because the 
countermeasures would have affected only the tax liabilities of 
physical or legal persons resident in the onshore domestic jurisdiction 
 
 154. IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM ABUSE, FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY 
LAUNDERING—BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (2001) [hereinafter IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
ABUSE], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf. 
 155. Id. at 19. 
 156. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities 
of the IMF during the relevant time period. 
 157. See the discussion about lack of coerciveness in TRN participation supra in Part 
I.A.  
 158. See IMF AND WORLD BANK, ENHANCING CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMBATING 
MONEY LAUNDERING: POLICY PAPER 2–9 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/ml/2001/eng/042601.PDF. 
 159. OECD, OECD’s PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2001 PROGRESS 
REPORT 8–9 (2001) [hereinafter OECD, PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES], 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf. 
 160. Id. at 13. 
 161. See infra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
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(or the flow of income passing through them to non-residents). None 
of the measures proposed would have required an OFC to collect 
taxes and remit them to an onshore jurisdiction; nor did the onshore 
jurisdictions threaten to withhold financial or other assistance.162 In 
effect, local tax authorities would withhold tax benefits from their 
own residents when they engaged in activities with tax havens. 
Nevertheless, the OECD was not simply discussing proposed 
standards that should be accepted by domestic authorities based on 
persuasion, but was advocating that local authorities enforce those 
standards by using state (i.e., hard) power. 
Nor did the countermeasures breach any generally accepted 
international obligation. While such an obligation could arise from a 
double-taxation convention (or possibly a bilateral investment 
treaty), no such treaties were affected; and even if they were, such 
treaties permit parties unilaterally to withdraw after a notice 
period.163 One possible problem was that the deductions, exemptions, 
and credits to be disallowed (or the reduction or elimination of 
withholding taxes to be foregone) were included in international 
income tax principles generally accepted by countries with income 
taxes, and accepted by the major onshore jurisdictions.164 Assuming a 
tax on income from capital, there are good reasons for the acceptance 
of these principles, which have been enshrined in the laws of most 
OECD countries and in the OECD Model Double Taxation 
Convention.165 In effect, the anti-tax haven OECD members were 
saying, “help us enforce our income taxes on our own people or we 
will adopt very different tax rules when our taxpayers engage in 
transactions with your taxpayers.” The threatened countermeasures 
may have been significant, but they were not illegal under 
international law or custom. If applied, the countermeasures would 
increase the tax owed to the onshore jurisdiction.166 Increasing that 
 
 162. OECD, PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 159, at 11–13. 
 163. See OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 93, art. 20; U.S. Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 16 (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
117601.pdf. But see George Rawlings, Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive 
Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty, 29 LAW & POL’Y 51, 51–56 (2007) 
(describing the shift from a “command-and-control regulatory approach” in dealing with 
tax havens to a more “responsive regulatory dialogue”). 
 164. For further discussion, see Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from 
Offshore Centers: Identity and Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money 
Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 279–81 
(2001). 
 165. See Vann, supra note 64, at 718, 719–22, and 725–29. 
 166. Increasing the withholding tax on dividends or interest paid to a non-resident 
located in an OFC could, at least in theory, be suffered by the offshore resident. However, 
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person’s taxes would reduce after-tax income, which would reduce 
the ultimate profitability of that person. That would act as a serious 
disincentive for that person to conduct business with a person located 
in a blacklisted jurisdiction, which would, in turn, create competitive 
pressure on the offshore jurisdiction to change its rules so that it was 
no longer blacklisted.167 This would be the exercise of hard power, but 
one that was applied to the OFC only indirectly, through the onshore 
resident party and through the operation of the market. 
These countermeasures, however, were offered as part of a 
concerted effort by OECD members to change how OFCs operated. 
As described above, they came in the form of a standard accepted 
only by certain members of the OECD (rather than generally 
accepted), via OECD-initiated assessments (rather than those of 
neutral parties), and of blacklisting by the OECD (again, rather than 
by a neutral party), followed by a concerted application of 
countermeasures by each local state (rather than through persuasion). 
In many ways this was a textbook example of how TRNs do not 
operate. This greatly exacerbated the negative reactions that 
followed. 
The OECD program opponents presented the program as a form 
of bullying which resulted in immediate protests by officials in those 
offshore jurisdictions. One major complaint was procedural, that the 
OECD was not a truly representative forum, but one dominated by 
wealthy onshore jurisdictions that essentially ignored all principles of 
due process. The Secretary General of the Commonwealth, which 
includes nearly all of the listed English-speaking tax havens, referred 
to the OECD as “prosecutor, judge, jury and jailer.”168 Another major 
complaint was more substantive, that the OECD, by imposing 
domestic tax policies on small offshore jurisdictions was practicing 
“economic imperialism” and discriminating against “small states.”169 
Predictably, the most vocal and effective complaint was that the 
 
the offshore resident would not be the actual taxpayer, in that tax is withheld at source, 
i.e., by the onshore resident. In other words, the effect on the offshore resident would only 
be indirect. 
 167. See J.C. Sharman & Gregory Rawlings, National Tax Blacklists: A Comparative 
Analysis, J. INT’L TAX’N, Sept. 2006, at 38, 47, 64 (describing the OECD Harmful Tax 
Competition initiative and discussing criticism of the initiative). 
 168. Anthony B. van Fossen, Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability, and Tax 
Havens in the Pacific Islands, 15 CONTEMP. PAC. 237, 260 (2003) (quoting Eugene 
Bingham & John Andrews, Islands Face Dirty-Money Backlash, N.Z. HERALD, Mar. 3, 
2001, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=174807 
&pnum=0). 
 169. Id. at 259 (quoting PALAU HORIZON, Aug. 24, 2001), 260 (quoting MONEY 
LAUNDERING MONITOR, Jan. 2001). 
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OECD’s “defensive countermeasures” were actually coercive 
sanctions, in effect the illegitimate application of hard power by the 
rich and powerful against the small and weak.170 
There was some agreement with this view in the popular press, 
among economists and think-tanks, and in academia.171 In effect, the 
offshore centers adopted what turned out to be a powerful rhetorical 
argument that the larger onshore centers were trying to impose 
“standards” that were neither internationally accepted nor even 
applicable to some of their own members.172 
Finally, the OECD Harmful Tax Practices Project was being 
carried out almost simultaneously with the Financial Action Task 
Force’s non-cooperating countries and territories initiative, and there 
was significant overlap between the two blacklists.173 One major 
complaint was that the two issues, tax evasion and the laundering of 
illegal proceeds, were being conflated and confused by the press and 
the public so that tax havens were confused with countries that 
allowed drug kingpins or corrupt dictators to hide their ill-gotten 
gains.174 
The OECD appeared to be caught somewhat unaware by the 
fierce nature of the reaction against the Harmful Tax Practices 
Project and began to change its tactics. While it could not find a TRN 
or an international organization with TRN characteristics like the 
IMF to support its initiative, the OECD took steps to make the 
process more inclusive and less confrontational. Starting in the spring 
of 2001, the OECD held regional face-to-face meetings with officials 
from the listed countries in an attempt to negotiate agreements.175 
 
 170. See SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 101–48. For further examples, see Vaughn E. 
James, Twenty-First Century Pirates of the Caribbean: How the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Robbed Fourteen CARICOM Countries of Their Tax and 
Economic Policy Sovereignty, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 28–39 (2002) 
(describing “the CARICOM reaction to OECD lists” and the “economic impact of the 
OECD listing on CARICOM nations”); Akiko Hishikawa, Note, The Death of Tax 
Havens?, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 401–12 (2002) (describing responses to the 
OECD’s designation as tax havens by the designated countries). 
 171. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 164, at 279–81 (arguing that countermeasures are in 
fact sanctions to remedy a breach of international obligations, but that because there are 
no such obligations with respect to tax the sanctions are illegitimate); James, supra note 
170, at 5 (“[T]he OECD, like pirates who plied the waters of the Caribbean during the 
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, has, through its ill-advised anti-harmful tax 
competition initiative, effectively robbed fourteen CARICOM nations of their sovereign 
right to determine their tax and economic policies.”). 
 172. SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 71, 101–48. 
 173. See infra Appendix. 
 174. See van Fossen, supra note 168, at 260. 
 175. See id. at 259–60. 
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Also, it was at this time that the replacement of the Clinton 
administration with the Bush administration resulted in a serious 
shifting of gears. 
Even during the Clinton administration, many conservative 
Republicans had opposed income taxes in general for ideological 
reasons while others opposed the OECD’s actions as a breach of 
international sovereignty.176 There had been little support among 
Republicans in the House and Senate for the OECD initiative; 
Richard Armey, the House majority leader, even called the OECD “a 
global network of tax police.”177 According to some press reports (and 
private discussions with administration officials), Lawrence Lindsey, 
then Director of the National Economic Council, and R. Glenn 
Hubbard, Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers (and 
incidentally Chairman, Economic Policy Committee, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development), both adopted views that 
the availability of tax havens not only helped keep tax rates in the 
United States down, but they actually helped U.S. companies 
compete by reducing tax rates.178 In June 2001, Treasury Secretary 
Paul O’Neill stated in a meeting at the OECD that the United States 
could no longer support the initiative, at least the way in which it was 
now being pressed.179 Also, as news of this development found its way 
back to the IMF, Huw Evans, IMF Executive Director for the United 
Kingdom, concluded that the efforts to involve the Fund in anti-tax 
haven activities would now be over. 
In response, the OECD took several actions. First, the shift in 
focus hinted at in a 2000 paper on bank secrecy became concrete. 
Moving beyond the existing OECD model on exchange of 
information, in 2002, the OECD published a new model covering 
both civil and criminal taxation matters, known as Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (“TIEAs”).180 The OECD also created the 
Global Forum on Taxation (later retroactively renamed Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information), with a 
principle goal of advancing the adoption of transparency in the 
 
 176. Id. at 261–62. 
 177. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. See Adam Cohen, Banking on Secrecy: Terrorists Oppose Scrutiny of Offshore 
Accounts. And So Do Many U.S. Bankers and Lawmakers, CNN.COM, Oct. 15, 2001, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/10/22/secrecy.html.  
 179. Id. This was also reported to the author by a senior civil servant at the OECD. 
 180. OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS 
(2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf; Press Release, OECD, OECD 
Releases Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (Apr. 18, 2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082244_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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ownership and control of companies and trusts and exchange of that 
information and other information on bank accounts, of which TIEAs 
were an essential part. From here on, the Global Forum and the 
Harmful Tax Practices programs moved forward in tandem. 
In 2003, Canada hosted a Global Forum meeting bringing 
together representatives of forty OECD and non-OECD 
governments.181 Many OFCs participated. They agreed to continue 
their work on advancing principles of transparency and exchange of 
information.182 
The following year, another Global Forum was convened in 
Berlin.183 The meeting sought to create an assessment process to 
determine how all jurisdictions, including OECD members,184 were 
complying with the goal of transparency and information exchange 
based on the TIEA process,185 particularly the “financial centers,” 
which included Andorra, Barbados, Brunei, Liechtenstein, Macao-
China, Malaysia (Labuan), and the Marshall Islands, among others.186 
Interestingly, the Forum called for a process with “fairness and 
integrity” and a “methodology and consistent framework” using an 
“agreed template.”187 The Forum also agreed that “the identification 
and review of significant financial centres should be a dynamic 
process and that these countries should be invited to participate in the 
Global Forum.”188 Finally, it agreed that “the information compiled 
about all the countries under review would be made available to the 
full Global Forum for comments and questions prior to finalisation,” 
and that “[w]here factual disagreements arise, a small group of . . . 
Participating Partners would be designated following an agreed 
process to try to resolve the factual disagreement.”189 
It seemed that the OECD learned from its Harmful Tax 
Practices experience. The new Global Forum adopted a less 
ambitious goal than the original Harmful Tax Practices set of four 
 
 181. Closing Statement by the Co-Chairs, OECD Global Forum on Taxation, Ottawa, 
(Oct. 16, 2003) http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_33745_16643264_1_1 
_1_1,00.html. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Press Release, OECD, Outcome, Conclusion of the Meeting of the OECD Global 
Forum on Taxation in Berlin (June 3–4, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en 
_2649_33745_31967429_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
 184. OECD, A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING A GLOBAL LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 2 (June 
4, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/0/31967501.pdf.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 6 n.7.  
 187. Id. at 6. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
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“key factors” in identifying “harmful preferential tax regimes.”190 The 
focus now was on information exchange, a principle that even OFCs 
might well accept as an acceptable standard. After all, many had 
signed exchange-of-information agreements with countries like the 
United States.191 Also, such a standard would still leave offshore 
centers considerable leeway in how to organize their domestic tax 
structures. 
Of particular interest is that the OECD made specific efforts to 
increase the number of jurisdictions involved in the process, including 
non-OECD countries and even assessed jurisdictions themselves. 
Increasing the number of members would help reduce the problem 
the OECD had in its Harmful Tax Practices—a small and relatively 
cohesive membership, identified above in Part I.B as a significant 
limitation in the legitimacy of TRNs. Next, the new program called 
for an agreed methodology and template for assessment, ensuring 
more consistency and uniformity among those assessed—another 
matter addressed in Part I.B. It also called for a review process 
involving the concerned parties, a third issue addressed above. And 
finally, there was no specific call for countermeasures. By moving 
toward a new Global Forum, the OECD was adopting many of the 
characteristics of successful TRNs. Meanwhile, by 2004 only five 
offshore centers remained on the OECD list, three of which, 
Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco, are located in Europe.192 
The next meeting of the Global Forum was in Melbourne in 
2005.193 The meeting attracted a significant number of offshore 
centers, although a number of invited OFCs did not attend.194 The 
report of the meeting noted progress in reviewing countries’ 
adherence to principles of transparency and effective exchange of 
information.195 The report also noted that the Global Forum effort 
was not the same as the Harmful Tax Practices effort, but that “the 
Report, once completed and as updated periodically, will provide 
more up-to-date information [than the OECD 2000 Harmful Tax 
 
 190. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 50, at 21.  
 191. See supra notes 67, 75–77 and accompanying text.  
 192. See OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 
PROGRESS REPORT 14 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf (listing 
Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of Monaco, and the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands). 
 193. See OECD, PROGRESS TOWARDS A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: OUTCOMES OF THE 
OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION, MELBOURNE (Nov. 2005), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/28/55/35670025.pdf. 
 194. See id. at 9. 
 195. See id. at 3. 
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Practice list]. This does not reflect any judgment by the Global Forum 
on the tax or other policies underlying country lists.”196 In other 
words, the two efforts were different, and the Forum did not replace 
Harmful Tax Practices, but those who had been adversely affected by 
the latter could count on the former to help out. 
OFCs rapidly began to enter into TIEA agreements with 
onshore jurisdictions.197 By the end of 2002, only six offshore centers 
and one onshore jurisdiction had not committed to effective 
exchanges of information.198 Meanwhile, by 2004 only five offshore 
centers remained on the OECD list, three of which, Andorra, 
Liechtenstein, and Monaco, are located in Europe.199 
 Nevertheless, the onshore centers did not get what they most 
wanted in the beginning of the process: the end of no (or low) income 
taxation or, barring that, the full reporting to onshore centers of all 
non-resident activities.
 
Because of this, an onshore resident could still 
easily evade income taxes by setting up a company and bank account 
in an offshore jurisdiction rather than in a jurisdiction that levied tax. 
While in cases of suspected tax evasion onshore tax authorities could 
request, and now receive, information from offshore jurisdictions 
about those specific taxpayers, those authorities would first have to 
suspect the evasion. Even if they did, they often would not know what 
information to request.200 On the other hand, OFCs were not fully 
satisfied. Complaints of undue pressure to force OFCs to accept 
burdens they should not have to—spending money to implement tax 
systems they do not believe in for the benefit of far richer countries—
continue.201 
 
 196. Id. at 8.  
 197. See Press Release, OECD, OECD Reports Progress in Fighting Offshore Tax 
Evasion, but Says More Efforts Are Needed (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/48/0,3343,en_2649_201185_39482288_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 198. See Press Release, OECD, The OECD Issues the List of Unco-operative Tax 
Havens (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082323 
_1_1_1_1,00.html (listing Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the 
Principality of Monaco, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, and 
the Republic of Vanuatu as the remaining “unco-operative tax havens”). 
 199. See OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 
192, at 14 (listing Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, the Principality of 
Monaco, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands). 
 200. “As noted, the OECD’s proposed solution has been bilateral tax information 
exchange agreements requiring exchange of information on request . . . which is not 
effective exchange of information.” Spencer, supra note 148, at 21 (emphasis added). For a 
discussion of the different types of tax evasion opportunities that remain, see generally 
Spencer & Sharman, supra note 148, at 35–49. 
 201. Interviews with various IMF staff, IMF Offshore Financial Center Assessment 
Program (Summer 2007–present). 
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The income tax standards system began with many detrimental 
attributes—no real TRN, no real international organization with 
TRN attributes—and depended largely on the actions of powerful 
states. It had difficulty producing generally accepted standards and 
implementing them successfully. It had less than perfect success in 
protecting the interests of weak states over the strong.  
The OECD shifted gears after the outcry raised against the 
Harmful Tax Practices Project. It created a far more inclusive sub-
organization—the Global Forum. The OECD turned away from a 
standard not widely accepted and adopted a less stringent but more 
widely acceptable standard. It adopted a system of assessment that 
was less arbitrary and that included a review process for the countries 
affected. And finally, it had no blacklist. By adding these components 
of successful TRNs, the Global Forum process was far more widely 
accepted. 
C. Prudential Regulation 
1.  The Basic Indictment202  
Onshore jurisdictions claimed that OFCs destabilized the 
international financial system by failing to implement prudential 
regulations, which allowed both offshore institutions and onshore 
institutions that use offshore facilities to avoid onshore regulations, 
putting them at greater risk of failure. While all prudentially 
supervised institutions (banks, insurance companies, and securities 
firms) were of concern to the onshore jurisdictions, banks were the 
primary focus of onshore attention. According to onshore 
jurisdictions, because OFCs either did not promulgate adequate 
prudential regulations or implement them effectively through a 
program of compliance, an OFC-chartered bank could act in ways 
that would threaten its own soundness. These could include lending in 
excess of a prescribed capital minimum and failing to control for 
default and concentration risk. Another allegation was that, in 
granting banking licenses, OFC regulators did not vet owners and 
controllers to see if they were “fit and proper,” which would have 
made poor management and poor compliance with prudential 
principles less likely. Together, these poor prudential practices would 
 
 202. This short section is a summary and reorganization of arguments presented during 
the early years of the debate (mid- to late- 1990s) on offshore financial centers and poor 
financial sector supervision. See Errico & Musalem, supra note 51, at 1–7; FINANCIAL 
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTRES 1–2 
(2000), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf. 
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lead to a greater likelihood of the bank failing, resulting in losses by 
creditors, especially depositors. The failure of any bank may lead to 
the failure of other banks, and even a loss of confidence in the entire 
banking system.203 If other onshore banks were creditors, this could 
adversely affect those banks, resulting in a chain reaction of defaults 
that could endanger the entire international financial system. 
There were a few money laundering issues raised in the financial 
supervisory context as well. The anti-money laundering measures 
were not prudential in nature in that they did not have as a goal 
keeping the bank solvent, but because their implementation in 
onshore jurisdictions was usually through the financial supervisor or 
regulator, they had the potential of becoming part of the “poor 
prudential regulation” indictment.204 The most important of these 
measures had to do with a requirement to identify the physical person 
who owned and controlled a particular customer account.205 Of 
course, such information was also critical for providing tax-related 
information to the major onshore centers. The regulatory arbitrage 
provided by offshore centers allowed their financial institutions, or at 
least financial institutions with an offshore presence, to operate more 
profitably by reducing the costs of regulation, rendering entirely 
onshore institutions less profitable and subject to unfair 
competition.206 
2.  The System in Action 
Domestic bank supervisors had problems supervising domestic 
banks with branches and subsidiaries located in foreign jurisdictions 
whenever those foreign establishments were domiciled in jurisdictions 
with strict bank secrecy.207 Supervisors also had trouble supervising 
 
 203. Vincent P. Polizatto, Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an 
Institutional Framework for Banks 1 (World Bank, Working Paper Series No. 340, 1990), 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/ 
1990/01/01/000009265_3960928161430/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
 204. An informal review in January 2000, of a subset of IMF member countries and 
offshore jurisdictions by IMF staff confirmed that in the vast majority of cases anti-money 
laundering rules were implemented through prudential regulatory bodies. The author 
participated in this review. 
 205. See OECD, IMPROVING ACCESS TO BANK INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, 
supra note 145, at 25. 
206.  Hermann Krull, Assistant General Counsel, South African Reserve Bank (1990–
1998, 2002), Statement During a Panel Discussion at the IMF Legal Department (Jan. 14, 
2000).  
 207. This was the reason that the Basel Committee created a working group on 
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments, resulting in the report. See BASEL COMM., 
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branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.208 Briefly, bank 
supervisors need the entire bank’s financial information (parent and 
branches or subsidiaries) to determine if the bank is heeding 
prudential regulations. In 1975, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, a classic TRN, issued a report on the importance of the 
supervision of banks’ foreign establishments in ensuring the safety 
and soundness of domestic banks,209 which made arguments that were 
extended in a paper in 1979 favoring consolidated supervision of 
banks’ international activities.210 In 1981, the Basel Committee 
published a report noting that banking secrecy can impede the flow of 
information needed by supervisors.211 While the report did not single 
out offshore centers, it did note that non-members of the Committee, 
“particularly offshore centers,” were in broad agreement.212 The 
report was followed by another exploring ways in which supervisors 
should share information about the activities of banks and their 
foreign branches and subsidiaries.213 Of great importance, the 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (“OGBS”),214 a TRN 
consisting of regulators in offshore centers, generally agreed to the 
various proposals to ensure the flow of information among 
supervisors.215 Some problems involving the limited membership of 
the Basel Committee were hence resolved. 
The bankruptcy of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (“BCCI”) in 1991 drew attention to the serious 
problems that could arise when there was no effective consolidated 
supervision of banks with foreign operations,216 especially when an 
 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN 
ESTABLISHMENTS 1 (1975), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf?noframes=1. 
 208. Id. at 5.  
 209. Id. at 1. 
 210. See BASEL COMM., CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ INTERNATIONAL 
ACTIVITIES 1 (Mar. 1979), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc112.pdf. 
 211. See BASEL COMM., BANKING SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
IN BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (1981), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00f.pdf. 
 212. Id. 
 213. BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN 
ESTABLISHMENTS § I (1983), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf.  
 214. The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (“OGBS”) includes fourteen 
offshore centers. See OGBS, Members and Observers, http://www.ogbs.net/members.htm 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009). Since 1983, a condition of OGBS membership is to support the 
1983 Concordat. See OGBS, Conditions of Membership, http://www.ogbs.net/conditions 
.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
 215. See BASEL COMM., INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN BANKING SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITIES (1990), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc313.pdf. 
 216. At the time it was closed by regulators in the summer of 1991, the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce (“BCCI”) was operating in sixty-nine countries. Duncan E. Alford, Basle 
Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 
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offshore center with allegedly lax supervision and “excessive” secrecy 
like the Cayman Islands was involved.217 The following year, the Basel 
Committee issued a report on minimum standards for the supervision 
of international banking groups.218 The minimum standards include 
that all international banks be supervised by a home-country 
authority that performs consolidated supervision, that banks and their 
foreign branches or subsidiaries receive the prior consent of both 
home country supervisor and host country supervisor, and that home 
country supervisors have the authority to receive information 
necessary to conduct consolidated supervision.219 Finally, if these 
minimum standards are not met, the report suggested that the host 
country supervisor either prohibit the establishment of foreign 
branches/subsidiaries or impose restrictive measures on them.220 In 
other words, hard power could be exercised against resident banks by 
local regulators. As with the OECD’s tax “countermeasures,” 
however, the market would ensure that the foreign jurisdiction would 
also suffer as a result. 
While the report put in place a process of improved cooperation 
among supervisors from both onshore and offshore jurisdictions, 
problems remained. In 1995, the Meridien Bank International, which 
was really two banks with one registered in Luxembourg221 and 
another, its seventy-four percent owner, licensed in the Bahamas, and 
with operational control of much of its activities located in London, 
collapsed and was placed into liquidation by the Bahamian Supreme 
 
26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 241, 258 (1992). The dispersal of subsidiaries and 
branches in so many countries made it easier for BCCI to avoid consolidated regulatory 
oversight. Id. at 263–64. See generally JOHN KERRY & HANK BROWN, 102D CONG., THE 
BCCI AFFAIR: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DRAFT) 
(1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/ (describing the structure 
of the BCCI that eventually led to its collapse). 
 217. According to Senators Kerry and Brown, “the Grand Caymans, did not regulate 
any bank licensed there. The Caymans lack of regulation was precisely the inducement for 
banks to charter themselves there.” KERRY & BROWN, supra note 216, pt. 12. This 
allegation was incorrect in that the Caymans did regulate banks and bank branches 
located there. This information comes from the author’s personal participation in the 
activities of the IMF as a senior staff member during the relevant time period. 
 218. See BASEL COMM., MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS 
(1992), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf. 
 219. Id. § II.1–3. 
 220. Id. § II.4. 
 221. It did no banking business in Luxembourg. This information comes from the 
author’s personal participation in the activities of the IMF as a senior staff member during 
the relevant time period. 
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Court.222 As with BCCI, regulators and commentators concluded that 
the use of complicated cross-border corporate structures allowed the 
bank to escape effective prudential supervision.223 
There was little doubt that both BCCI and Meridien showed no 
effective supervision and that supervisors needed to pay better 
attention to cross-border issues, but it was not clear in either case that 
offshore centers were to blame for the failure. In both instances 
supervisory authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom 
appeared to be at least partially at fault by not taking effective action 
even after noting clear warning signs that the banks were not 
complying with existing rules. For example, in the BCCI case, much 
was made of the role played by politicians and lobbyists in fending off 
appropriate supervisory action.224 
At the same time, other banking problems unrelated to these 
specific cross-border supervisory issues were gaining attention. 
Because the international community’s eventual response to these 
issues played such a crucial role in shaping the treatment of OFCs, 
this discussion now turns to the series of crises and near-crises in a 
number of emerging markets. The most prominent crises were in 
Asia, which had particularly adverse effects on domestic banking 
systems. These macroeconomic crises were largely caused by large 
external borrowings and significant balance of payments deficits. 
Many banks had excessive external exposures and foreign exchange 
risk that resulted in insolvency; had local supervision been better, 
some argued, these banks would not have been so vulnerable to 
economic shocks and would have made recovery after the crises faster 
and less disruptive.225 
The first of these shocks was the 1994–95 Mexican Peso Crisis. 
The first significant emerging-market, sovereign debt crisis since the 
late 1980s,226 the Peso Crisis resulted in significant financial support to 
 
 222. Interview with Herman Krull, former Assistant General Counsel, South African 
Reserve Bank, in Cleveland, Ohio (Sept. 21, 2008). The bank had an exceptional liquidity 
crisis, which it was allegedly able to hide from regulators by shifting cash among its many 
constituent parts. 
 223. See IMF, TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 47 (1998). 
 224. KERRY & BROWN, supra note 216, pt. 13. 
 225. See generally Liliana Rojas-Suarez & Steven Reiss Weisbord, Financial Market 
Fragilities in Latin America: From Banking Crisis Resolution to Current Policy Challenges 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 94/117, 1994) (examining the impact of the strength of the Latin 
American domestic banking system and domestic supervision in restoring confidence in 
the financial system after a financial crisis). 
 226. See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND 1979–1989, at 477–534 (2001) (detailing the sovereign debt crises for 
various countries during the 1980s). 
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Mexico from the IMF and the United States.227 A key analysis by the 
IMF of the Peso Crisis suggested that macroeconomic variables 
largely determined the timing of bank failures while it was bank-
specific prudential indicators that explained the likelihood of bank 
failure.228 
By 1995, the two different issues—the lack of effective 
consolidated supervision of cross-border banking and the ineffective 
domestic supervision in many countries suffering macroeconomic 
shocks—became conflated.229 In 1995, the G-7 announced that much 
more work was needed in creating and implementing appropriate 
prudential supervisory standards in all countries.230 Specifically, they 
stated that closer international cooperation in the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions was “essential to safeguard the 
financial system and prevent an erosion of prudential standards” and 
called on finance ministers to “commission studies and analysis from 
the international organizations responsible for banking and securities 
regulation and to report on the adequacy of current arrangements 
. . . .”231 In particular, they urged that the IMF and World Bank be 
involved, but that they “concentrate on their respective core concerns 
(broadly, macroeconomic policy for the IMF and structural and 
sectoral policies for the World Bank).”232 In partial response, a 
Working Group on Stability in Emerging Market Economies 
convened under the sponsorship of the Group of 10.233 
 
 227. Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves US$17.8 Billion Stand-By Credit for Mexico 
(Feb. 1, 1995), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/PR9510.HTM (describing the 
IMF’s credit line to Mexico for purposes of alleviating the Mexican financial crisis and 
adding confidence to the international financial system). 
 228. See generally Brenda González-Hermosillo et al., Banking System Fragility: 
Likelihood Versus Timing of Failure—An Application to the Mexican Financial Crisis 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 96/142, 1996) (examining the proposition that bank soundness is 
determined by bank-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions with regard to the 
Mexican Financial Crisis). 
 229. These issues became of significant interest to the IMF, which had generally been 
more concerned with macro rather than micro policy. See, e.g., Morris Goldstein & Philip 
Turner, Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Origins and Policy Options 9–13, 21–24 
(BIS, BIS Economic Paper No. 46, 1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
econ46.pdf?noframes=1; CARL-JOHAN LINDGREN ET AL., BANK SOUNDNESS AND 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY 39–46, 123–35 (1996). 
230.  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, HALIFAX SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ, 
para. 22 (1995), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/past_summit/21/ 
e21_a.html.  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
 233. In addition to Argentina, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the 
working group also included Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia. THE WORKING GROUP ON 
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The IMF and World Bank also set up staff working groups to 
consider these issues while the Basel Committee continued its efforts 
to refine standards. In 1996, the Basel Committee, again with full 
cooperation and participation from the Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors, released another report that addressed a number of 
practical considerations in implementing the 1992 Report, especially 
regarding confidentiality of exchanged information.234 The Basel 
Committee also accelerated its work on creating a set of generally 
accepted principles for effective banking supervision; these “Core 
Principles,” which focused on acceptable standards for prudential 
regulation of domestic banking, were released late in 1997.235 In 
particular, the Core Principles require that supervisors practice 
consolidated supervision and that they “apply[] appropriate 
prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by their 
banking organizations worldwide” and that they “require the local 
operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same high 
standards as are required of domestic institutions and must have 
powers to share information needed by the home country supervisors 
of those banks for the purpose of carrying out consolidated 
supervision.”236 In releasing the Core Principles, the Basel Committee 
“suggested that the IMF, the World Bank, and other interested 
organizations use the Core Principles in assisting individual countries 
to strengthen their supervisory arrangements in connection with work 
aimed at promoting overall macroeconomic and financial stability.”237 
There was no mention of offshore centers. Similar activities with 
respect to the creation of best practices or standards were underway 
for the two other key elements of the regulated financial system, 
securities markets (including broker-dealers) and insurance, to be 
 
FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, FINANCIAL STABILITY IN 
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 1 (1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten02.pdf. 
 234. BASEL COMM., THE SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING 10, 12 (1996), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.htm. Key issues addressed were preserving confidentiality 
of information obtained by bank supervisors from foreign supervisors and creating 
standard procedures for the conduct of cross-border inspections by home-country 
supervisors. Id. 
 235. BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 2 
(1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm. The Core Principles cover seven principal 
areas: preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing and structure, prudential 
regulations and requirements, methods of banking supervision, information and record-
keeping requirements, formal powers of supervisors, and cross-border banking. Id. The 
work on developing the Core Principles was conducted in close cooperation with both the 
IMF and World Bank, but particularly with the former. 
 236. Id. at 7. 
 237. Id. at 2. 
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carried out by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (“IOSCO”) and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”).238 
In April of 1997, the Working Group on Financial Stability239 
issued its report, which urged the creation of “an international 
consensus on the key elements of a sound financial and regulatory 
system” by representatives of both developed and developing 
countries, including the “formulation of norms, principles and 
practices by international groupings of national authorities with 
relevant expertise and experience,” such as the Basel Committee, 
IAIS, and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions.240 It also called for the “[p]romotion by multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the regional 
development banks of the adoption and implementation of sound 
principles and practices.”241 More specifically, the report suggested 
that, as part of its Article IV surveillance activities, the IMF should 
“take stock of the progress that countries with clear vulnerabilities 
have made in the adoption of sound principles and practices 
developed by the international groupings.”242 The report went on to 
state that “the IMF and World Bank should develop modalities for 
sharing their assessments of financial sector strength and the 
regulatory and supervisory regimes in individual economies,” that 
IMF conditionality could “include steps to correct shortcomings in 
the financial sector,” and that the two organizations should provide 
 
 238. The history and background on these two organizations are on their Web sites. 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors [IAIS], http://www.iaisweb.org/ 
index.cfm?pageID=28 (last visited Sept. 10, 2009); International Organization of Securities 
Commissions [IOSCO], http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2009). While both the IAIS (IAIS Members, http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm 
?pageID=31) and IOSCO (IOSCO Members, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members 
.cfm?memID=1&orderBy=none) have large memberships, as a practical matter, the 
organizations and their key committees have been dominated by the larger, developed 
country members. The author personally observed this dynamic while working with 
members of the organizations as a staff member at the IMF. 
 239. The Working Group was an ad hoc group consisting of Argentina, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Representatives of the Basel Committee, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee, and IOSCO also attended most meetings, as did staff members of the Bank 
for International Settlements (“BIS”), the European Commission, IMF, the OECD, and 
the World Bank. THE WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EMERGING 
MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 233, at 1. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 2. 
 242. Id. at 7. 
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technical assistance as well.243 In other words, the IMF (and where 
appropriate, the World Bank) should advance the adoption of 
banking and other financial-sector principles or best practices in its 
three main areas of work: surveillance, loan conditionality, and 
technical assistance. The Basel Committee, a TRN with limited 
membership, was asking the IMF, an international organization with 
TRN characteristics but with near universal membership, to 
participate. 
Almost immediately after the report was issued (and just before 
the Basel Committee issued its Core Principles), the Asian financial 
crisis struck,244 followed by crises in Russia, Ukraine, and Ecuador.245 
A considerable amount has been written on the history, development, 
causes, and global responses to the series of economic meltdowns that 
began in Thailand in July 1997.246 There were a number of different 
views as to what caused Thailand, then South Korea and Indonesia, 
to move toward a massive default on external (and then internal) 
obligations. One thing on which virtually all commentators agreed is 
that the banking systems in each country were not well run; they were 
under-capitalized and had taken on far too much risk, including 
exchange rate risk and credit risk.247 They agreed that the key 
problem causing excess credit risk was excessive connected lending, 
where banks lent money to connected parties on non-arms-length 
terms.248 In some instances, these were banks lending money to 
members of an affiliated corporate group; in others it was banks 
lending money to relatives or business associates of bank officers or 
board members.249 In many instances, the banks were controlled by 
the government, which exerted influence on banks to direct lending 
to favored borrowers; thus, when the financial crisis hit and investors 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. IMF, A Factsheet—The IMF’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis (1999), 
http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.htm.  
 245. During this time the author was involved in the crafting of IMF loans and loan 
programs for each country. 
 246. According to one analyst, by 1999 more than 16,000 articles, journals, and reviews 
had already been published on the topic. Michael H. Moskow, The Asian Financial Crisis, 
in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 11, 11 
(William C. Hunter et al. eds., 1999). 
 247. See Roberto Chang, Origins of the Asian Crisis: Discussion, in THE ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 65, 65–
68; Michael P. Dooley, Origins of the Crisis in Asia, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 27, 27–29; William C. 
Hunter, The Korean Banking Crisis: Picking up the Pieces, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 127, 127–28. 
 248. Hunter, supra note 247, at 127–28. 
 249. Id. 
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fled from local currencies, banks were unable to pay their creditors, 
which were often foreign banks, resulting in illiquidity and 
insolvency.250 Clearly, the banking systems in these countries had not 
been adequately supervised. 
Another issue related to the causes of the Asian financial crisis 
was what was termed “contagion,” where a serious loss of investor 
confidence in one country could spread to other countries as investors 
lost confidence in similar countries.251 Perhaps more importantly, 
there was significant evidence that bank illiquidity or insolvency in 
one country could spread to creditor banks in another country, 
resulting in illiquidity or insolvency in that country.252 
While the problems in these banking systems were not new, they 
had not been the subject of IMF attention during the annual Article 
IV consultations, where IMF staff review the economies of member 
countries. Yet, when the IMF stepped in to provide financing, the 
problem of poor banking supervision was brought immediately to the 
fore; bank restructuring, plus new and improved banking regulation, 
was seen as a key to the reform program.253 Bill Murden, then a senior 
official at the U.S. Treasury Department, explained: 
[The Working Group on Financial Stability] issued a report in 
April 1997, in time for the 1997 Denver Summit. The report 
looked at some of the problems in the financial sectors in 
emerging markets . . . and recommended a concerted strategy 
for improving the financial sectors and financial supervision in 
these economies, including a more in depth role by the IMF and 
the World Bank . . . . Out of that process came some very 
significant developments, including the Basle Committee’s 
Core Principles . . . which were released later that fall . . . . A 
year later, [The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions] issued a similar set of principles. Unfortunately, 
we did not have time to implement the strategy before the Asia 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Taimur Baig & Ilan Goldfajn, Financial Market Contagion in the Asian Crisis 6–7 
(IMF, Working Paper No. 98/155, 1998) (showing evidence for contagion by examining the 
behavior of financial markets). 
 252. Haizhou Huang & Chenggang Xu, Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and 
Financial Crises 14 (IMF, Working Paper No. 00/92, 2000). 
 253. See Stijn Claessens et al., Korea’s Financial Sector Reforms, in THE ASIAN 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 167, 
173–76. For a brief discussion of the IMF’s bank reform conditionality for Korea, see 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The International Monetary System and the Erosion of Sovereignty: 
Essay in Honor of Cynthia Lichtenstein, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 268–69 
(2002). 
GORDON.PTD5 2/9/2010  1:23 PM 
550 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
crisis erupted in the summer of 1997 in Thailand and quickly 
spread to Indonesia and Korea by that fall.254 
What Murden did not mention explicitly was that the three 
countries hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea, were part of the working group that issued the 
Report. 
Unlike with the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices initiative, the 
promulgation of prudential banking standards did not require the 
IMF to conclude that a country should make a sacrifice for the benefit 
of another; unsound domestic banking systems, management and staff 
concluded, adversely affected the well being of the country itself, and 
had potential contagion effects on other countries. With respect to 
this second issue, there was an additional distinction from the 
Harmful Tax Practices Project: Article I(i) of the Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement included as one of its purposes “[t]o promote 
international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution 
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems.”255 This had been interpreted 
broadly to include oversight of the “international financial system,” 
which arguably would include contagion effects from a problem in 
banks honoring cross-border obligations.256 
What happened next was a multi-pronged attempt to find ways 
to prevent future crises, an effort known broadly as “strengthening 
the international financial architecture.”257 Unlike with the OECD’s 
work on harmful tax competition, this work involved, at least in 
theory, not only the IMF and World Bank but representatives of 
developing countries themselves. Among the various prongs was the 
ongoing work on financial standards—the promulgation of the Basel 
Core Principles258 (and to a lesser extent the analogous standards of 
the IAIS259 and the IOSCO260) through the work of the IMF and the 
 
 254. William Murden, Banking Supervision and Government Policy: The Role of 
Regulators in International Financial Crises, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 35, 36–37 
(1999). 
 255. IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. I(i). 
 256. See infra notes 297–301and accompanying text. 
 257. IMF, A Factsheet—The IMF’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis, supra note 
244. 
 258. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 24, at 2. 
 259. IAIS, PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSURANCE BUSINESS 2 (1999), 
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Principles_for_conduct_of_insurance_business.pdf. 
 260. IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (1998), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf. 
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World Bank.261 Also, in 1998, the G-22, a group of developed and 
developing countries (including Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia),262 
set up three working groups to examine issues related to 
strengthening the international financial architecture, one of which 
focused on strengthening financial systems.263 In theory at least, the 
heads of the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the Bank for 
International Settlements (another treaty organization) attended 
meetings as observers, but, in practice, the IMF (and, to a lesser 
extent, the World Bank) staff were most closely involved in the 
working group’s activities. 
In the spring of 1999, a new international group, the Financial 
Stability Forum (“FSF”), was created.264 It included central banks, 
finance ministries, and financial system supervisory authorities from 
twelve developed countries, plus the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank 
for International Settlements (“BIS”),265 the OECD, the Basel 
Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS, as well as some others.266 Again, IMF 
and World Bank staff were closely involved in promoting the FSF’s 
research and conclusions. 
 
 261. In order to better coordinate the work of the IMF and the World Bank on 
financial sector issues, the two organizations set up the Financial Sector Liaison 
Committee, which consisted of senior staff members from the IMF and the World Bank 
who met periodically to coordinate the financial sector work of the two institutions. It was 
set up in 1998. IMF, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORLD BANK-IMF FINANCIAL SECTOR 
LIAISON COMMITTEE (FSLC) 1 n.1 (1999), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/fslc/ 
121599.htm. 
 262. The G-22 consisted of finance ministers and central bank governors from a broad 
range of developed and developing countries, including the three most adversely affected 
by the Asian financial crisis (Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia), and those affected by the 
1995 Peso crisis and sovereign insolvencies in former Communist countries, Mexico, and 
Russia. The others were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. GROUP OF 22, REPORT OF THE WORKING 
GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES, at i n.1 (1998), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/g22/ifcrep.pdf. 
 263. See IMF, Reports on the International Financial Architecture, http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/g22/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 264. Financial Stability Board, History, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
history.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 265. “The BIS is an international organization that fosters international monetary and 
financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks.” BIS, About BIS, 
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 266. The Financial Stability Forum included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom, plus the European Central Bank and three other standard setting 
organizations related to accounting and payment systems. IMF, A Guide to Committees, 
Groups, and Clubs, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm (last visited Nov. 
9, 2009). 
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It was clear that the IMF was going to play a key role in adopting 
and promulgating any new rules of the road for avoiding future 
financial crises.267 In the late spring of 1998, Michel Camdessus, at 
that time the Managing Director of the IMF, outlined a key aspect of 
the approach: a set of standards and codes, including banking 
supervision, that would be “progressively disseminated by the IMF 
through its surveillance.”268 Soon after, the Fund published Toward a 
Framework for Financial Stability, which proposed: 
The IMF, with its near-universal membership, has an important 
role to play in . . . the broad dissemination of the work of 
various organizations, particularly that of the Basle Committee 
[and] . . . with its broad responsibility to engage in surveillance 
of member countries’ economic policies . . . can assist in 
identifying potential vulnerabilities . . . and it can help the 
authorities in formulating corrective policies.269 
The benefits of universal membership were obviously not shared 
by the Basel Committee,270 and although IOSCO and IAIS had larger 
membership bases, they too were dominated by their larger 
members.271 
The Group of 22’s Report of the Working Group on 
Strengthening Financial Systems, released in the fall of 1998, had few 
surprises. It announced an “international consensus” on banking and 
securities supervision, specifically endorsing the Basel Core 
Principles, including principles on information exchange for 
supervising internationally active financial groups.272 It also called on 
the IMF and World Bank to enhance their work in the area, anchored 
in IMF surveillance.273 The IMF and World Bank, in coordination 
 
 267. This conclusion was obvious, even at the time. See Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle 
Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 
1, 36–39 (1998) (suggesting that the IMF will play a great role in implementing Basel Core 
Principles and other Basel accords as a type of “soft” international law). 
 268. Michel Camdessus, Managing Dir. of the IMF, at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs: Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World (May 
8, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/050898 
.htm). 
 269. IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, TOWARD A FRAMEWORK 
FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 1 (1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wefs/ 
toward/pdf/file01.pdf. 
 270. See supra note 20. 
 271. See supra note 238. 
 272. GROUP OF 22, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STRENGTHENING 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 3–4, 47 (1998), http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/sfsrep.pdf. 
 273. Id. at 46–50. The Report was later endorsed by the G-7, although this was a 
foregone conclusion. University of Toronto Munk Centre for International Studies, G7 
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with the G-22 and the new Financial Stability Forum, worked to 
develop a new international effort to encourage the adoption and 
implementation of financial standards. 
This work led to the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(“FSAP”), a new program piloted in 1998 and adopted the next 
year.274 The purpose of the FSAP was to identify strengths and 
vulnerabilities of a country’s financial sector, in part by assessing its 
compliance with key international financial standards, such as the 
Basel Core Principles and related standards on insurance and 
securities regulations.275 The IMF and World Bank agreed that they 
should divide assessment work between them based on their areas of 
competence, with some being exclusively IMF, others exclusively 
World Bank, and others being of joint responsibility.276 Basel Core 
Principle assessments were to be the responsibility of the IMF.277 The 
assessments would be summarized in Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (“ROSCs”).278 The purpose of ROSCs was to 
summarize the extent to which jurisdictions observe certain 
internationally recognized standards and codes.279 
There were a number of key features of the FSAP, most 
importantly the ROSC program that developed over the first few 
years. The program’s notable features included that the adoption and 
assessment of internationally recognized standards remain 
voluntary280 (meaning persuasion and perhaps market forces but no 
coercion) and that assessments be independently conducted and 
consistently applied across countries (meaning there should be 
 
Leaders Statement on the World Economy, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/g7_103098 
.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 274. Much of the thinking for the Financial Sector Assessment Program (“FSAP”) had 
gone on earlier; the pilot program was actually carefully thought out. See generally IMF, 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND FUND SURVEILLANCE—PROGRESS AND ISSUES 
(Aug. 16, 1999), http://imf.org/external/np/rosc/stand.htm (describing various case studies 
and research related to strengthening the international financial system).  
 275. See IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (May 19, 2009) 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp (explaining in general the use of a FSAP). 
 276. IMF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND FUND SURVEILLANCE—PROGRESS 
AND ISSUES, supra note 274, at tbl.1 & para. 70. 
 277. Id. paras. 69–70 (follow link to section IV). 
 278. Id. paras. 5–6 (follow link to section I). 
 279. Id. paras. 5–7. Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (“ROSCs”) 
were initially known as “Reports on the Implementation of Standards and Codes.” Id. 
para. 6. However, the acronym RISC bore unfortunate connotations, resulting in a change 
of name. 
 280. Id. para. 18. 
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impartiality).281 As Part I.D notes above, these two criteria are among 
those proposed for a truly successful TRN standard.
 
Also, there was some debate in the beginning as to whether 
countries could be required to publish ROSCs, but, as a practical 
matter, countries that chose to participate in the pilot program did 
not object to publication.282 Finally, additional technical assistance 
could then be offered to countries to help address weaknesses 
identified in the assessment process: a carrot but not a stick.283 In 
order for assessments to be as objective as possible, detailed 
methodologies for assessment were required, and these 
methodologies for the Basel Core Principles were drafted with the 
close cooperation of IMF staff.284 In other words, the FASP and 
ROSC procedures were designed to ensure a uniformly objective 
compliance assessment process with key features posited as being 
part of successful standards for TRNs. 
While the FSAP and ROSC programs were being devised and 
piloted, the IMF and the G-7-dominated FSF turned once again to 
the issue of offshore centers.285 During the Asian crisis and those 
crises that followed in Russia, Ukraine, and Ecuador, not a single 
offshore center experienced a significant problem in its regulated 
financial sector. Nevertheless, both the IMF and FSF managed to find 
problems with the operations of offshore banking and, at least in part, 
made valiant efforts to tie these problems to banking problems in the 
crisis countries. 
In early 1999, the Fund issued a staff working paper entitled 
Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-Prudential 
Issues.286 IMF staff interest in offshore banking issues had been 
prompted in part by the continuing expression of interest from the 
United States and French Executive Directors (among others), 
although many staff members involved expressed serious doubts 
about whether offshore centers posed any real threat to the 
 
 281. While IMF management, staff, and Executive Directors often referred to the 
FSAP and ROSC assessment programs as part of IMF surveillance, from a legal 
perspective they were actually technical assistance, which under Article V, section 2 is 
strictly voluntary. See IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. V, § 2.  
 282. See IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 275. 
 283. IMF ARTICLES, supra note 102, art. V, § 2. 
 284. IMF, DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: PROGRESS REPORT 3 (1999) 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rocs/progrev.pdf. 
 285. The concern resulted in another report. See FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTRES 16 (2000), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf. 
 286. See Errico & Musalem, supra note 51. 
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international financial system.287 Almost bizarrely, the paper 
concluded that “[o]ffshore banking has most certainly been a factor in 
the Asian financial crisis [and has] . . . also played a significant, but 
not catalytic, role in the recent Latin America crises,” even though 
the body of the paper identifies virtually no role at all.288 The paper 
went on, however, to discuss in general terms the issues raised by 
offshore banking. The paper claimed that there are “legitimate” and 
“dubious” reasons for banks to use OFC facilities; oddly, the paper 
listed among the former “convenient” fiscal and regulatory regimes 
that lowering explicit and “implicit” taxation increases net profit 
margins.289 The paper also noted the ease of incorporation, legal 
frameworks for protecting the privacy of the principal-agent 
relationship, and the freedom from exchange controls offered by 
OFCs.290 Among the illegitimate are bank secrecy (“almost 
invariably” a selling point), tax avoidance and evasion, and money 
laundering.291 
The paper suggested that the “greater leeway for balance sheet 
management, granted by favorable regulatory frameworks in OFCs, 
make offshore banks potentially more vulnerable . . . to solvency and 
foreign exchange risks.”292 And yet, the paper also concluded that 
“offshore banks are less likely to be unprofitable and more likely to be 
profitable than onshore banks.”293 It also noted that, typically, a much 
larger percentage of offshore bank investments tend to be in other 
onshore banks, and that offshore banks are often simply intermediate 
deposits between offshore and onshore banks.294 In what at least 
appears to be a desperate effort to find a way to condemn offshore 
banking from a prudential perspective, the paper concluded that 
while offshore banks are far more likely to be liquid (since their 
regulators do not enforce capital standards with the verve of their 
onshore counterparts) the offshore banks may be more highly 
leveraged and therefore less solvent, although no risk-weighted data 
 
 287. The author was involved in these ongoing discussions throughout the relevant 
time period. 
 288. Errico & Musalem, supra note 51, at 4. The paper also notes that offshore facilities 
may have contributed to problems in Thailand and Malaysia, but in those cases the 
offshore “centers” were within Thailand and Malaysia themselves. Id. at 33–34. 
 289. Id. at 6–7, 10. 
 290. Id. at 6.  
 291. Id. at 10. 
 292. Id. at 4. 
 293. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
 294. Id. at 14–16. 
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was available.295 In short, the working paper found little factual 
material to support the charge that offshore center banks were 
somehow dangerous, although it nevertheless concluded that they 
were. 
The paper was followed the next year by a report of the FSF’s 
working group on offshore centers. Not surprisingly—given the 
content of the paper—the FSF report concluded that “OFCs, to date, 
do not appear to have been a major causal factor in the creation of 
systemic financial problems.”296 The report did, however, also 
conclude that OFCs could cause contagion problems in the future due 
to the growth in assets and liabilities of OFC financial institutions 
(and the inter-bank nature of the market) and the suspected growth 
in off-balance-sheet activities.297 The report distinguished between 
OFCs with weak supervision and those with strong supervision and 
went on to distinguish between prudential concerns and, what they 
termed, “market integrity concerns,” the latter having a meaning 
similar to the IMF paper’s “dubious purposes.”298 The Executive 
Summary report listed the old OFC tax issue of information exchange 
as a key prudential problem, but it added a far more general concern 
over a lack of prudential supervision.299 Again, similar to the IMF 
paper, the FSF report also noted that jurisdictions that followed 
international standards were at risk of losing business to the lax 
jurisdictions.300 
With respect to market integrity, the report noted that while 
offshore centers did not pose immediate risks to international 
financial stability, by hampering international surveillance and law 
enforcement, they eroded the integrity of international financial 
markets and, therefore, represented a potential threat to global 
financial systems.301 The report highlighted “the lack of . . . 
information on beneficial ownership of corporate vehicles . . . [that] 
can thwart efforts directed against illegal business activities.”302 
Noting the work of the IMF in the FSAP program and in 
preparing ROSCs, the report called for a similar assessment program 
 
 295. Id. at 29 & n.41. 
 296. FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
OFFSHORE CENTERS 16 (2000), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_0004b.pdf. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 2. 
 299. Id. at 1–6. 
 300. Id. at 18. 
 301. Id. at 1. 
 302. Id. at 2. 
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for all OFCs, based on a priority list of those with the greatest 
problems.303 The report recommended focusing on three areas: (1) 
cross-border cooperation, information sharing, and confidentiality; 
(2) supervisory powers and practices; and (3) customer identification 
and record-keeping.304 Specifically, it suggested that the assessment 
program include subsets of the Basel Core Principles, IAIS principles, 
and IOSCO principles (as well as of the Financial Action Task Force 
anti-money laundering recommendations) all linked to these three 
areas.305 The report also listed a menu of possible incentives to 
enhance OFCs’ adherence to “international standards,” from limiting 
market access to OFC-based institutions to increasing due diligence 
for onshore financial institutions when doing business with offshore-
based ones to restricting or prohibiting financial transactions with 
those institutions.306 
At the time, many IMF staff reacted with dismay to the report. 
Many staff agreed with the general conclusion that offshore centers 
had not been a weak link in the world financial system. And, while 
they agreed that many offshore jurisdictions applied a light 
supervisory hand, they did not believe that the result was a weak 
banking system; agreeing instead with the IMF paper, they felt that 
offshore banks were healthy—largely because they did not make 
risky investments.307 Instead, it appeared that the proposed offshore 
center assessment program addressed other issues referenced in the 
report, including the fear that onshore jurisdictions could be losing 
out to offshore ones in the global competition for banking services. 
But, of greatest concern was that by focusing on information sharing, 
customer identification, and transparency of ownership, the Working 
Group was really concerned about tax, and to a lesser extent, money 
laundering.308 And, as discussed above, many staff believed that it was 
illegitimate for the IMF to suggest that one jurisdiction should 
commit sacrifices to benefit another.309 A number of staff most closely 
 
 303. Id. at 20–28. 
 304. Id. at 28. 
 305. Id. at 58–68. 
 306. Id. at 32 fig.7. 
 307. Unless, of course, investing in onshore banks was risky, which—during the current 
international financial crisis—turned out to be the case. The information contained in this 
paragraph comes from the author’s personal participation in the activities of the IMF as a 
senior staff member during the relevant time period. 
 308. Because the papers noted that the offshore banks were often more profitable, and 
because they could point to no actual instances in which offshore banks contributed to the 
crisis, these arguments were rather weak. 
 309. See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text. 
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involved in putting together the new offshore center program 
expressed their belief that the program had little or nothing to do 
with prudential regulation, which they believed actually was a 
legitimate subject for IMF involvement. Instead, they wondered if it 
was all a subterfuge to help the OECD and its member states in the 
Harmful Tax Practices Project. Given the strong support voiced by 
the Financial Stability Forum for an offshore center assessment 
program to complement the FSAP and ROSC programs already in 
progress, it was no surprise that IMF management moved promptly to 
propose a pilot assessment program.  
The IMF papers on the subject echoed some of the contentions 
that OFCs may have played some kind of role in recent banking 
failures and the need to improve cross-border information exchange, 
customer identification, and transparency of ownership of legal 
persons.310 Interestingly, they also discussed at some length other 
OFC initiatives, including the OECD tax competition program and 
the recent anti-money laundering initiative of the FATF involving so-
called non-cooperating countries and territories initiative 
(“NCCT”).311 Like the tax competition program, the NCCT 
program312 assessed a select group of jurisdictions, most of which were 
OFCs, and threatened them with “countermeasures” if they did not 
comply with a set of anti-money laundering standards created by the 
FATF. One of the staff involved in drafting the IMF background 
papers noted that discussing the work of the OECD and FATF, 
including their aggressive threats to levy “countermeasures,” would 
make it less likely that the Executive Board would endorse any IMF 
involvement in either tax or anti-money laundering initiatives.313 
However, the proposed assessment program differed from the 
FSF recommendations by suggesting that all jurisdictions should be 
assessed on the entire set of Basel Core Principles (and relevant Basel 
Committee reports), in addition to insurance and securities standards 
where appropriate.314 The report also noted that those onshore 
centers where offshore bank branches/subsidiaries were subjected to 
 
 310. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS—THE ROLE OF THE IMF, paras. 5–7 
(2000) [hereinafter IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF], http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ 
oshore/2000/eng/role.htm; IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS IMF BACKGROUND 
PAPER (2000) [hereinafter IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER], http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm. 
311.  IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 310, § III & tbl.3. 
 312. See discussion infra at notes 401–05, 437 and accompanying text. 
 313. Conversation with un-named senior staff member, IMF, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 
2000). 
 314. As proposed in IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF, supra note 310, paras. 38, 43–45. 
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consolidated supervision would also have to be assessed, even noting 
that there were serious gaps because onshore supervisors often do a 
poor job.315 The proposal accommodated anti-money laundering 
issues, noting that Basel Core Principle Fifteen included ensuring an 
effective anti-money laundering program.316 
Of key importance, the report made no mention of the exercise 
of hard power—no carrots or sticks. While the report accepted the 
FSF proposal of three modules, with the first being an assisted self-
assessment, the second and third assessments resembled assessments 
in the FSAP program, that is, strictly voluntary, resulting in ROSCs to 
be published only with the agreement of the jurisdiction involved.317 
As with the FSAP program, additional technical assistance could then 
be offered to help OFCs address weaknesses identified in the 
assessment process.318 The IMF Executive Board agreed, emphasizing 
the strictly voluntary and cooperative nature of the exercise.319 
As a result, the FSF’s proposal—a selective assessment of Basel 
Core Principles and anti-money laundering principles with a threat of 
possible “countermeasures” if the OFC did not measure up—was 
replaced with a voluntary extension of the Basel Core Principles 
assessment part of the FSAP and ROSC program to offshore centers. 
In effect, the FSF (and its sponsors in the major onshore jurisdictions) 
was hoisted on its own petard. Arguably, the FSF wanted the IMF’s 
OFC program to address what was outside the mandate of the Fund: 
the competitive advantage of offshore banks. Legitimate, institutional 
causes, such as fewer regulations, along with unfair issues like tax 
competition and money laundering, all contributed to a competitive 
advantage that the OFCs had over their onshore counterparts. In 
order to make the argument for IMF involvement, the FSF had to 
claim that the issue stemmed from bad prudential regulation.320 In 
effect, the IMF accepted this argument and proposed that it fold 
 
 315. IMF, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 310, § III. 
 316. Basel Core Principle Fifteen states, “Banking supervisors must determine that 
banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, including strict ‘know-
your-customer’ rules that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial 
sector and prevent the bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal 
elements.” BASEL COMM., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 6 
(1997), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf?noframes=1. Basel Core Principle assessment 
of this principle tended to be cursory. 
 317. IMF, ROLE OF THE IMF, supra note 310, para. 37. 
 318. Id. paras. 61–64. 
 319. News Brief, IMF, IMF Board Reviews Issues Surrounding Work on Offshore 
Financial Centers (July 26, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2000/nb0062.htm. 
 320. See discussion supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text. 
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OFCs into its onshore assessment program, all without adopting the 
proposals that would have targeted the FSF’s real concerns. 
By 2006, all offshore centers except one eventually consented to 
being assessed and to publishing their assessments.321 The reasons for 
this were varied and no doubt included a significant amount of 
lobbying, but there were a number of practical reasons as well. IMF 
staff heard a number of different comments voiced by officials in 
offshore jurisdictions as to why.322 Certainly, in some instances, there 
was a fear that if a particular jurisdiction did not participate it would 
be assumed to be in serious non-compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles, which could then be cited by onshore regulators as a 
reason for restricting banking activities with offshore institutions. In 
other words, onshore regulators could exercise hard power with 
domestic banks that would have negative effects on offshore banks. 
Next, many offshore centers believed that their banks were safe and 
sound and that a truly impartial assessment by the international civil 
servants of the IMF would likely give them at least passing marks. 
They may not have trusted the onshore jurisdictions to be fair, but, 
unlike with the OECD, they placed faith in the skills and impartiality 
of IMF staff (or at least they decided that the IMF staff was more 
impartial than the sub-state regulatory members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision). Offshore centers were already 
the subject of essentially involuntary assessments under the OECD’s 
Harmful Tax Practices Project (and the FATF’s NCCT program); 
they might in some instances have hoped that the cooperative and 
less biased IMF assessment could be used as a tool to counter the 
work of the G-7 civil servants who dominated the OECD and the 
FATF. 
As it turned out, overall, offshore centers did quite well in their 
assessments. By the time of the first OFC progress report to the 
Executive Board, there had been twelve self-assessments and ten 
IMF-staff assessments leading to ROSCs for compliance with the 
Basel Core Principles (and a smaller number of ROSCs for insurance, 
 
 321. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM—A 
PROGRESS REPORT 11 tbl.2 (2006), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/ 
020806.pdf. 
 322. The author interacted extensively with officials of offshore centers, both on-site 
and in Washington. In particular, the IMF held regular outreach meetings with offshore 
officials during this time where those officials were invited to discuss their views. The 
statements in this paragraph are the author’s conclusions based on the statements of those 
officials. 
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IAIS, and securities, IOSCO, supervisory principles).323 While some 
of the newer (and poorer) offshore centers fared less well, the older 
established offshore centers performed better than many onshore 
centers.324 The most significant problems lay in the set-up and 
operations of the supervisors themselves, including the examination 
process,325 and, in particular, supervision over credit risk and market 
risk.326 However, while the report notes that a lack of effective 
supervisory implementation may result in problems, the report does 
not suggest that any of the banking systems assessed were in any way 
actually weak. Frequent discussions among assessors suggested that 
none were actually concerned over potential bank failures.327 
Although local bank examination of credit and market risk was a 
problem, banks themselves did not appear to be behaving too riskily, 
in part because so much of their business was actually intermediation 
between depositors and other onshore banks, and in part because 
many of the banks were also the subject of consolidated supervision 
by onshore jurisdictions.328 In that regard, staff assessments generally 
found good cooperation with respect to sharing information with 
onshore regulators.329 Of particular interest, staff noted that OFCs so 
far had a better record of compliance with the Basel Core Principles 
than did onshore jurisdictions.330 
These first impressions were largely confirmed as the Offshore 
Financial Center Program continued forward, eventually covering all 
offshore centers by 2004.331 One significant effect of the assessments 
was that OFCs did work to improve their prudential supervisory 
programs, including passing new laws and regulations to bring them 
into fuller compliance with the Basel Core Principles (especially with 
 
 323. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTER PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT 3, 6 fig.1 
(2002) [hereinafter IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT], http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ 
oshore/2002/eng/032802.pdf. 
 324. Id. at 10. 
 325. Id. at 10–12. 
 326. Id. at 12 tbl.3. 
 327. The author participated in the drafting of the paper and discussed this issue with 
the assessors. The unanimous view of those assessors was that none of the banking systems 
assessed to date were actually weak. 
 328. As the current financial crisis has shown, this may not have been terribly 
reassuring, but at least onshore regulators—and their state governments—had no reason 
to complain that the offshore centers were riskier. 
 329. IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 323, 17–18. 
 330. Id. at 13 tbl.4. In the table, “Initial Countries” are all onshore jurisdictions. As can 
be seen, offshore centers have a higher rate of compliance with Basel Core Principles. Id. 
 331. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM—AN 
UPDATE 5 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE], 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/031204.pdf. 
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respect to the independence of the supervisor, on-site examinations, 
and a focus on credit and market risk),332 but it was not at all clear 
that these improvements materially improved the actual safety and 
soundness of the various banking systems. In a 2003 review of the 
program, staff found that OFCs had supervisory deficiencies similar 
to onshore countries.333 The review also found that larger, wealthier 
OFCs generally meet very high supervisory standards.334 
The review the following year actually found that compliance 
levels for OFCs were, on average, more favorable than those for 
other jurisdictions assessed by the IMF in its financial sector work.335 
By early 2005, forty-one of the forty-four OFC jurisdictions had been 
assessed under the first phase of the OFC program.336 A review by 
IMF staff that year found that “[c]ompliance with standards in OFCs 
is, on average, better than in other jurisdictions assessed under the 
FSAP, reflecting in part the higher average income levels of the 
OFCs. Results on cooperation and information sharing principles, 
which play a key role in cross-border supervision, show a similar 
pattern.”337 The second phase was to focus on monitoring compliance 
through assessment updates every four to five years, with a focus on 
providing technical assistance to less wealthy jurisdictions to help 
improve their compliance.338 Finally, in 2008, the Offshore Center 
Program merged with the FSAP, treating offshore centers, in essence, 
like their onshore counterparts.339 
 
 332. IMF, 2002 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 323, at 22–24. “Overall compliance 
with the Basel Core Principles was generally appropriate to the nature of the business 
conducted, especially in important jurisdictions where compliance was found to be broadly 
in line with that in advanced economies.” IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTER 
PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, 2003 PROGRESS REPORT], 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2003/eng/031403.pdf. 
 333. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS, THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: A 
PROGRESS REPORT AND THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM 12 (2003), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/mae/oshore/2003/eng/073103.pdf. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 331, at 7, app. II 
(showing that Basel Core Principles assessed in all jurisdictions had, on average, a lower 
rate of compliance than in just offshore jurisdictions). 
 336. IMF, OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS: THE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: A 
PROGRESS REPORT 6–8 (2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/022505.pdf. 
 337. Id. at 3. The review also found deficiencies, including “inadequate onsite 
inspections, inability to address cooperation on terrorist financing, need to expand mutual 
legal assistance treaties, and lack of formal agreements to share information.” Id. 
 338. See id. at 6–8. 
 339. See Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/82, IMF, IMF Executive Board 
Integrates the Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program with the FSAP (July 9, 
2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/pn0882.htm. 
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As a result of the IMF’s insistence that offshore centers be 
assessed in a fair, consistent, and uniform manner, it was shown that 
those centers largely conformed to the universal banking supervision 
standards. There was no longer any reason to treat them separately. 
Offshore centers had scored a significant victory. The prudential 
standards system included many beneficial TRN attributes (and, with 
the IMF participating, even more legitimacy than just the Basel 
Committee alone possessed), was far superior to the Harmful Tax 
Practices Project, and was more legitimate than the Global Forum 
program. It not only produced generally accepted standards to be 
applied and implemented impartially, but it protected the interests of 
weak states over the strong. 
D. Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
1.  The Basic Indictment340 
Onshore jurisdictions also claimed that OFCs assisted criminals 
by failing to implement anti-money laundering principles, which 
allowed criminals more easily to retain the proceeds of their crimes. 
Among the most important anti-money laundering principles was a 
requirement that financial institutions “know your customer,” 
including knowing who controlled the account and whether the 
source of the funds was likely to be criminal. These principles also 
required financial institutions to monitor accounts to see if they might 
indicate criminal proceeds and report to a government agency when 
they did. Finally, the principles stated that this information should be 
made available to other jurisdictions.341 
By not enforcing such rules, onshore centers claimed that 
criminals were allowed to hide the fact that they owned or controlled 
an account, either because the accounts were actually anonymous 
(such as numbered accounts) or because the account holder was a 
company or other legal arrangement in which the owner and 
controller was not revealed. Next, the criminal could make deposits of 
his ill-gotten gains to these accounts, often through a transfer from 
another bank, without any questions being asked as to the origin of 
the funds. When the criminal wanted use of the funds, he would 
 
 340. This short section is a summary and reorganization of arguments presented during 
the initial debate (late 1990s) on jurisdictions that were deemed to be “non-cooperative” 
with respect to anti-money laundering efforts. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], 
REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 1–2 (2000), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/57/22/33921735.pdf. 
 341. Id. 
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implement a transfer to an account in his or her own name, typically 
in a large onshore jurisdiction. By running criminal proceeds through 
these effectively anonymous accounts, onshore banks would not be 
able to discover the origins of the funds, or whether the account was 
controlled by a criminal laundering the proceeds. Any request for 
information by another jurisdiction would either be rebuffed because 
the information was not available or because of laws protecting 
financial secrecy.342 
Other principles also included having jurisdictions extend 
cooperation to each other in investigating and prosecuting alleged 
criminals involved in laundering. Offshore centers, it was alleged, 
either rebuffed such requests directly or provided such poor 
cooperation that little assistance was actually given.343 Following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, onshore jurisdictions 
extended their criticism to include inadequate cooperation in the 
“global war on terror.” One requirement of this “war,” adopted as 
international law by the U.N. Security Council, was to seize accounts 
owned or controlled by known terrorists and terrorist organizations. 
The larger onshore jurisdictions also agreed that a failure to 
implement “know your customer” rules made it impossible to seize 
the funds of known terrorists.344 
2.  The System in Action 
Sustained global interest in anti-money laundering policies began 
in the 1980s, primarily in the context of concern over international 
drug trafficking.345 Because the drug trade (and other illegal activities) 
generated huge profits, criminals found it necessary to find a way to 
introduce the cash into the formal financial system so that it could be 
 
 342. Id. 
 343. See id. at 5. 
 344. This was a key issue of discussion at the FATF Emergency Session meeting in 
Washington, D.C., October 29–30, 2001. The author was present during this meeting. The 
Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing, adopted by the FATF soon after 
September 11, 2001, required the freezing of terrorist assets and the implementation of 
U.N. Security Council resolutions that included specific names of terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. However, the FATF’s so-called Un-cooperative Countries and Territories 
process, started nearly two years earlier, was not changed to include terrorism financing in 
the initiative beyond the request that countries complete a separate terrorism financing 
questionnaire. FATF, FATF ACTS AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING, MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND NON-COOPERATIVE JURISDICTIONS 1–3 (Feb. 1, 2002), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/50/36/33935095.pdf. 
 345. Richard K. Gordon, Anti-Money-Laundering Policies: Selected Legal, Political, 
and Economic Issues, in 1 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
LAW 405, 407 (1999). 
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moved, spent, or invested without drawing the attention of law 
enforcement. However, simple deposits or transfers of huge amounts 
of cash could draw the attention of law enforcement. Criminals, 
therefore, needed to disguise the illegal origins of the proceeds of 
crime and/or their ownership of the proceeds. Early anti-money 
laundering legislation made it a crime for financial institutions 
knowingly to participate in such activities.346 However, to be truly 
effective, an anti-money laundering regime needed to be 
implemented in every jurisdiction where drug money might be 
laundered and introduced into the international financial system. As a 
result, a number of the major onshore centers, most notably the 
United States and France, took the lead in pressing for an 
international anti-money laundering effort.347 
The first major international agreement to enact uniform anti-
money laundering laws was the U.N. Convention Against the Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (also called 
the Vienna Convention).348 The Convention required all parties to 
enact legislation providing for the identification and confiscation of 
laundered drug money and set out procedures for mutual legal 
assistance in countering money laundering.349 In 1990, the Council of 
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) was adopted,350 
and the following year, the first European Directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering was adopted.351 
The next major international step to enhance global anti-money 
laundering efforts came with the creation of the Financial Action 
Task Force in 1989, following the G-7 Summit in Paris.352 The original 
Task Force consisted of sixteen OECD countries.353 The Task Force 
was inter-governmental in nature, with members represented by sub-
state entities like financial supervisors (in this aspect at least it was 
 
 346. See id. at 405, 407–10. 
 347. Interview with un-named senior staff member, Fin. Action Task Force, in 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1998).  
 348. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493, 26 U.N.T.S. 3 (1992). The original treaty was 
adopted in 1988. Id. 
 349. Id. arts. 5, 7–11. 
 350. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. 141. 
 351. Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 1 (EC). 
 352. See FATF, About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379 
_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 353. Id. 
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like a TRN), as well as criminal investigators and prosecutors.354 
While the latter two were not like classic TRN members, at least they 
were not states. While the FATF had a small secretariat, the work of 
the FATF was carried on almost entirely by its members. Less than a 
year later, the FATF published355 its first set of Forty 
Recommendations (“FATF 40” or “the Recommendations”),356 
which were designed to provide a comprehensive plan of action for 
fighting money laundering and which looked somewhat like an anti-
money laundering standard. Drafted primarily by representatives 
from U.S. sub-state participants, the Recommendations covered the 
criminalization of money laundering and the freezing and seizing of 
criminal proceeds, preventive measures for banks such as customer 
identification and record keeping, transaction monitoring and the 
filing of suspicious activity reports when a financial institution 
suspected money laundering, and cross-border cooperation in 
investigating and prosecuting money laundering.357 In this, the FATF 
also looked much like a classic TRN, using the expertise of members, 
but suffering from the detrimental effects of a membership limited 
primarily to large industrialized countries.358 
In 1991, the FATF began its program of yearly self-evaluations 
of compliance by completing questionnaires, and its mutual 
evaluation program.359 The mutual evaluations involved on-site 
assessments of compliance with the Recommendations, undertaken 
by experts drawn solely from other members.360 The following year, 
FATF helped set up the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
(“CFATF”), the first FATF-style regional body designed to advance 
adoption of the FATF 40.361 This was followed by the formation of 
the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the FATF found 
 
 354. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998 
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including 
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities. 
 355. See FATF, About the FATF, supra note 352. 
 356. FATF, FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (June 20, 2003), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF. 
 357. Id. at 2, 5–6, 9–11. 
 358. See discussion of the nature of TRNs supra at Part I.C. 
 359. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT 
1991/1992 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1992), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/39/35752730.pdf. 
 360. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998 
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including 
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities. 
 361. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT 
1992/1993 ANNUAL REPORT 5, 21 (1992), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/61/ 
34325384.pdf. 
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the mutual evaluation procedures of the CFATF and the Offshore 
Group of Banking Supervisors to be in conformity with the FATF’s 
principles.362 While membership in regional bodies required a political 
commitment to implement the FATF 40 and to undergo mutual 
evaluations, no treaty obligation was involved and no timetable was 
set for implementation.363 The FATF also expanded its membership 
to include twenty-four members of the OECD plus Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and representatives of the European Commission and the 
Gulf Co-operation Council.364 This expansion, both of its own 
membership and of regional bodies, helped to offset the negative 
effects of the FATF’s original restricted membership. 
While the FATF created a set of technical anti-money laundering 
standards, it sought to implement them with techniques that went 
beyond simple persuasion. The FATF also worked on developing 
appropriate “countermeasures” to those jurisdictions that failed to 
adequately implement anti-money laundering policies.365 
In 1996, the FATF revised the Recommendations to extend anti-
money laundering preventive measures to non-bank financial 
institutions.366 In addition, it also agreed to apply “preliminary 
sanctions against certain [FATF] members” that did not comply with 
the Recommendations (note that the term “countermeasures” was 
not used).367 By 1998, the CFATF and the Asia Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering together included all of the offshore centers in the 
 
 362. See FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997, 
paras. 5–6, http://www.jya.com/fatf96-97.htm. 
 363. See Caribbean Financial Action Task Force [CFATF], CFATF Overview 
http://www.cfatf-gafic.org/component/content/article/17-main/8-cfatf-overview.html (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2009). The “uncommitted” commitment to implement the FATF 40 was 
discussed at a number of CFATF meetings and later at the Asia-Pacific Group on Money-
Laundering (“APG”) and the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-
Money-Laundering Measures (“PC-R-EV”), now known as “Moneyval.” The author 
attended meetings of the APG as a representative of the IMF from 1998 to 2004, where he 
heard such comments. Also during that period, he discussed the issue with delegates from 
member countries of the CFATF and the PC-R-EV where he heard such comments. 
 364. FATF, About the FATF, supra note 352. 
 365. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998 
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including 
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities. 
 366. FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, pt. c (1996), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/15/51/40262612.pdf. 
 367. FATF, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ANNUAL REPORT 1996–1997, supra 
note 362 para. 32 (emphasis added). 
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Caribbean and Asia listed both in the OECD’s 2000 tax haven list and 
in the FATF’s Non-cooperating Countries and Territories 2000 list.368 
During the early 1990s, FATF members expressed concern about 
jurisdictions they believed were key weak links in enforcing anti-
money laundering rules.369 According to the FATF, at that time many 
onshore jurisdictions, including almost all poorer or developing 
countries, had little or no anti-money laundering rules or 
enforcement. However, it was the role played by some key offshore 
jurisdictions that was frequently mentioned as the most troublesome. 
Many of these jurisdictions allegedly provided benefits to launderers 
that the vast number of poorer and developing countries did not: they 
were usually “tax havens,” they had a first-world financial 
infrastructure, and a first-world legal system to protect property 
rights.370 The 1996 FATF 40 included Recommendation 21, which 
stated that financial institutions should give heightened due diligence 
to business relations and transactions with persons from jurisdictions 
that “do not or insufficiently apply [the] Recommendations.”371 Such 
heightened due diligence could result in a financial institution 
refusing to undertake transactions with the person from a non-
complying jurisdiction, but the Recommendation was vague on this 
issue.372 The Recommendation was an invitation, however, for local 
regulators to use hard power on their domestic institutions to ensure 
compliance on the part of non-resident institutions, in a manner quite 
similar to that recommended for both tax and prudential standards 
enforcement.373 
 
 368. Membership of the CFATF includes every OFC in the Caribbean region. See 
CFATF, CFATF Overview, supra note 363. The membership of the Asia Pacific Group 
includes every OFC in the Asia region. See Asia/Pacific Group, Overview of Members, 
http://www.apgml.org/apg-members/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009); Appendix, infra. 
 369. The author served as an IMF representative at FATF meetings starting in 1998 
and continuing through 2004 and observed the operations of the FATF in detail, including 
engaging in discussion with the FATF secretariat and delegates from sub-state entities. 
 370. Interview with Rick McDonnel, Head of Secretariat, Fin. Action Task Force, 
Paris, Fr. (May 12, 2007). The first-world financial structure included branches or 
subsidiaries of onshore banks or domestic onshore banks that were an accepted part of the 
international financial system and trust and company service providers to assist in access 
to the financial system. 
 371. FATF, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (1996), supra note 366, at 5, 
Recommendation 21. 
 372. For further discussion of this issue, see Hartman, supra note 164, at 273–78. 
 373. As there was no formal enforcement mechanism within the FATF, the only way to 
enforce the FATF 40 was for local regulatory authorities to accept the standard and 
enforce it domestically. See the discussion of enforcement of TRN-developed standards 
supra in Part I.A. 
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There are a number of reasons why offshore centers might not 
have wished to make full implementation of the FATF’s 
recommendations a priority. The primary purpose of anti-money 
laundering rules is to reduce criminal activity by reducing the ability 
to enjoy the profits of crime.374 However, the vast majority of 
criminals and criminal activities were onshore, not off; therefore, 
implementing such policies was likely to help onshore jurisdictions far 
more.375 Because implementation of such policies was relatively 
costly, especially to financial institutions,376 there may have been 
relatively little “non-altruistic” reasons to expend such cash. Also, 
because the implementation of anti-money laundering rules required 
clients of financial institutions to jump through more hoops regarding 
such matters as identification,377 implementation might have hurt 
business. 
By 1999, key FATF members, led again primarily by the United 
States and France, determined that diplomatic efforts, plus the threat 
of implementation of Recommendation 21, had not been enough to 
encourage these allegedly troublesome jurisdictions to change.378 
Taking as their model the OECD’s harmful tax competition project,379 
FATF delegates began to formulate an analogous anti-money 
laundering program, putting together the Non-Cooperating Countries 
and Territories process.380 In doing so, the FATF made a number of 
crucial decisions. 
First, analogous to the Harmful Tax Practices Project and the 
detrimental issues involved in that system, the FATF delegates chose 
not to include in its initial review all jurisdictions that failed to follow 
the FATF 40, but rather those they believed were causing the most 
 
 374. See Gordon, supra note 345, at 409. 
 375. See the discussion in Gordon, supra note 345, at 413–14. This point was made 
repeatedly to the author during meetings with officials from OFCs during the period of 
2000 to 2004. 
 376. See Richard K. Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search 
for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 721–25, 728–29 (2008). 
 377. See, e.g., FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3, Recommendation 5 (2003), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF. Recommendation 5 requires 
financial institutions to identify all clients, including beneficial owners or controllers. Id. 
This includes beneficiaries of trust accounts as well as directors and controlling 
shareholders of companies. Id. This is far more onerous than simply requiring the name 
and address of the client of record. 
 378. Interview with un-named high ranking official for a FATF-member country, in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (July 2000).  
 379. The modest FATF Secretariat was physically housed at the OECD’s Paris 
headquarters, which may have lead to the FATF adopting some of OECD ideas during 
mutual staff coffee or lunch breaks in the OECD mess. 
 380. Interview in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 378. 
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practical problems.381 For this purpose, they put together an ad hoc 
group to determine which jurisdictions should be included in the 
initial review.382 The reasons for so doing were obvious, as most 
countries in the world had yet to adopt and implement the FATF 40; 
to cover all countries would require too many resources. However, by 
selecting only a subset of such countries, they left themselves open to 
criticism. FATF members wound up selecting a relatively large 
number of jurisdictions for review, including a number of large 
onshore jurisdictions like the Philippines and Russia.383 Eventually, 
FATF examined a total of forty-seven countries or territories in two 
rounds of reviews.384  
Unlike the Harmful Tax Practices Project or even the prudential 
supervisory program, the FATF already had a standard formally 
endorsed by virtually all of the jurisdictions they wished to examine: 
the FATF 40. Although when signing on to the FATF-style regional 
bodies the jurisdictions had not pledged to implement the FATF 40 
by a specific date, at least they had accepted it as the applicable 
standard against which their anti-money laundering policies should be 
judged through a mutual evaluation process.385 Nevertheless, the 
FATF decided neither to apply the full FATF 40 as the standard by 
which cooperation would be judged nor to rely on the FATF-style 
regional body mutual evaluations to determine compliance.386 Rather, 
the FATF chose to create a special set of twenty-five criteria based on 
a subset of the FATF 40, and to assess compliance with the twenty-
five criteria themselves.387 The FATF also contemplated a “certain 
subjectivity” in assessments.388 This failure to apply the same standard 
 
 381. FATF, REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, supra 
note 340, at 6 (“FATF members have been invited to mention those jurisdictions where, in 
the recent past, there have been difficulties, with an explanation of the nature of the 
difficulties that were encountered.”). 
 382. See id. at 6–7. 
 383. See FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR 
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING MEASURES 9 (2000), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf. 
 384. Interview with Rick McDonnel, supra note 370.  
 385. Id. 
 386. Interview in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 378.  
 387. See FATF, REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, 
supra note 340, at 1–7. 
 388. “No specific criteria can be considered a litmus test of a particular jurisdiction’s 
level of co-operation in the international fight against money laundering. Rather, each 
jurisdiction must be judged by the overall, total effect of its laws and programmes in 
preventing abuse of the financial sector or impeding efforts of foreign judicial and 
administrative authorities.” Id. at 6. 
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indicated more detrimental attributes, in that a successful standards 
system should apply the same standard to all. 
Many of the twenty-five criteria focused on the core of the 
preventive measures in the FATF 40, including inadequate regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions, inadequate fit and proper 
test rules for the licensing and creation of financial institutions, 
inadequate customer identification requirements for financial 
institutions, excessive secrecy provisions regarding financial 
institutions, and a lack of an efficient suspicious-transaction reporting 
system.389 Other criteria focused on law enforcement (lack of a 
financial intelligence unit) and on international cooperation.390 But 
others, such as “[i]nadequate commercial law requirements for 
registration of business and legal entities” and “lack of identification 
of the beneficial owner(s) of legal and business entities,” were new.391 
There simply was no single standard for all. 
For jurisdictions that were found to be non-cooperative with 
respect to these criteria, proposed responses could include: 
[s]pecific actions . . . by other multi-lateral fora (e.g., the G-7, 
the OECD, the Basle Committee, IOSCO and the International 
Financial Institutions) to seek the issuance of public statements 
or other appropriate action. In particular, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, could examine the 
consequences of a particular jurisdiction’s failure to take 
appropriate corrective action, in connection with their 
activities.392 
Other proposed responses involved applying Recommendation 
21 to financial institutions with respect to heightened due diligence.393 
And finally, again reminiscent of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices 
Project, the Report proposed the application by FATF members (as 
opposed to financial institutions located within FATF-member 
jurisdictions), collectively or individually, of “counter-measures,” 
including “[c]onditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting 
financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions.”394 
 
 389. Id. at 2–4. 
 390. Id. at 4–6. 
 391. Id. at 4. 
 392. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 393. Id. at 8. 
 394. See id. 
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In February of 2000, the FATF published its first review.395 The 
vast majority of the OFCs listed in the initial forty-seven did not 
make it to the “uncooperative” list.396 While it was not clear from the 
report why this was the case, a number of persons who were part of 
the review process reported that the United Kingdom worked to keep 
its offshore territories off the list, while Canada also worked to keep 
off the list a number of territories with which it had close relations 
and which it represented on the Executive Board of the IMF.397 The 
Cayman Islands, one of the most important OFCs in terms of total 
business transacted, did make the list. The report noted that the 
Caymans had no requirement for customer identification and 
recordkeeping, the most essential of the anti-money laundering 
preventive measures, as well as little active bank supervision.398 Other 
jurisdictions like the Bahamas, Dominica, and the Marshall Islands 
were listed primarily for not providing information on beneficial 
ownership of legal persons or arrangements,399 something that most 
onshore jurisdictions also did not do. A number of other relatively 
minor OFCs (in terms of total business transacted) were on the list 
and were also uncooperative tax havens; three of these, the Cook 
Islands, Nauru, and Niue, also had no customer identification 
requirement.400 A number of others with serious shortcomings, 
including Russia and Lebanon, were not offshore centers at all. 
As noted earlier in Part II.B.2, the NCCT process was 
proceeding more or less parallel with the OECD’s Harmful Tax 
Practices Project. Jurisdictions named as NCCTs complained as well, 
and for many of the same reasons: the defensive “countermeasures” 
were actually coercive sanctions, or the illegitimate application of 
power by the rich and powerful against the small and weak.401 Again, 
there was some agreement with this view in the popular press as well 
 
 395. FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR 
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra note 383, at 1. 
 396. See infra Appendix.  
 397. The author personally observed these discussions during February of 2000. 
 398. FATF, FATF REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES OR 
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING MEASURES, supra note 383, at 4. 
 399. Id. at 2, 5, 7. 
 400. The Cook Islands did not require customer identification for offshore banks 
(defined as banks that do not accept resident customers), id. at 4, while Nauru lacked 
regulations of any kind, id. at 8, and Niue had deficiencies in customer identification, id.  
 401. See supra notes 169, 170, 172 and accompanying text. 
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as in academia.402 While the FATF 40 was at least arguably a standard 
accepted by virtually all of the OFCs on the NCCT list via their 
membership in an FATF-style regional body, the twenty-five criteria 
by which they were assessed were not.403 This allowed the offshore 
centers to claim that the larger onshore centers were trying to impose 
standards that were neither internationally accepted nor applied to 
some of their own members.404 As with the tax competition program, 
another key complaint was that the process of assessing the 
jurisdiction’s compliance lacked all the hallmarks of due process 
posited to be found in the most successful standards system; in 
particular, the assessments were certainly neither uniform nor 
impartially applied.405 Objectivity was noticeably absent. 
In 1996, a staff member in the Monetary and Exchange Affairs 
Department published a paper on the macroeconomic implications of 
money laundering.406 In the paper, he argued that laundering created 
inaccuracies in macroeconomic data, investment decisions based on 
ease of laundering rather than on rate of return, erosion of confidence 
in financial markets, tax evasion, and finally an increase in underlying 
criminal activities (i.e., predicate offenses) that would result in the 
promotion of private economic benefits over social welfare.407 
In response, the IMF Legal Department disputed each of these 
views, suggesting that if a problem existed it was that anti-laundering 
policies resulted in inaccurate macroeconomic data, skewed 
investment decisions, erosion of confidence in markets, and tax 
 
 402. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 164, at 263–64 (arguing that countermeasures are in 
fact sanctions as a remedy for a breach of international obligations, but that because there 
are no such obligations with respect to tax, the sanctions are illegitimate); James, supra 
note 170, at 5 (“[T]he OECD, like pirates who plied the waters of the Caribbean during 
the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, has, through its ill-advised anti-harmful tax 
competition initiative, effectively robbed fourteen CARICOM nations of their sovereign 
right to determine their tax and economic policies.”). 
 403. This was because the standard had been created solely by the FATF and its 
members, meeting without consultation with outsiders. See supra notes 387–91 and 
accompanying text. 
 404. See SHARMAN, supra note 135, at 71, 86–93. 
 405. See id. at 75, 86–88; see also John Burgess, 15 Nations Cited as Havens for Possible 
Money Crimes, WASH. POST, June 23, 2000, at E3 (quoting the Cayman Islands’ 
government in criticizing their placement on the FATF list as “made without due 
process”). 
 406. PETER QUIRK, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MACROECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING (1996). 
 407. Id. at 2, 18–19, 27–28. 
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evasion.408 As for the argument that crime is bad, the article noted 
that while this is obviously true, relying upon this argument would 
lead logically to a position that all anti-crime efforts were within the 
IMF’s mandate. This position would be self-evidently unworkable.409 
Informal discussions among the Legal Department and Executive 
Board offices, management, and senior staff at other IMF 
Departments confirmed a strong general inclination for the IMF to 
avoid money laundering issues because they were primarily related to 
criminal enforcement and, therefore, beyond the Fund’s mandate and 
expertise.410 
Nevertheless, in part to placate the American and French 
governments, the IMF agreed to send staff members as observers to 
FATF and FATF-style regional bodies. As the FSAP/ROSC program 
was being developed, the United States established a slightly different 
tack. In early 2000, U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers sent 
a letter to the International Monetary and Financial Committee411 at 
the Fund and the Development Committee at the World Bank,412 
urging the two to “step up” their efforts to combat money 
laundering.413 Noting the recent “increased engagement . . . on 
financial sector issues and assessments,” Secretary Summers urged 
the IMF and World Bank to include money laundering measures in 
financial sector reform programs.414 In particular, the United States 
lobbied to include the FATF 40 as a standard to be assessed under 
 
 408. Gordon, supra note 345, at 410–14. Although published as an opinion by a senior 
lawyer in the Legal Department, it was done so with the encouragement of the IMF’s then 
General Counsel. 
 409. Id. at 414–17. 
 410. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and 
participated in these discussions. 
 411. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (“IMFC”) is composed of 
twenty-four IMF governors, ministers, or others of comparable rank. See IMF, A Guide to 
Committees, Groups, and Clubs, supra note 266. The Committee advises the IMF’s Board 
of Governors. Id. Each member country that appoints, and each group of member 
countries that elects, an Executive Director appoints a member of the IMFC. Id. 
 412. The Development Committee’s formal title is the Joint Ministerial Committee of 
the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to 
Developing Countries. It is composed of twenty-four World Bank governors, finance, or 
development ministers or others of comparable rank. It advises IMF and the World Bank 
Board of Governors on development issues. Each World Bank member country that 
appoints, and each group of member countries that elects, a World Bank Executive 
Director appoints a member of the IMFC. See Dev. Comm., About the Development 
Committee, http://go.worldbank.org/XC5NCJDH40 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 413. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Statement to the Development 
Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Apr. 17, 2000), 
http://imf.org/external/spring/2000/dc/usa.htm. 
 414. Id. 
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the FSAP/ROSC and OFC programs.415 There apparently were a 
number of reasons the United States wished for the IMF and World 
Bank to add anti-money laundering to the FSAP program. One was 
that it would bring added attention to money laundering issues. 
However, another was that the IMF, with its near universal 
membership and independent staff, would add legitimacy to an 
assessment practice that was lacking in the NCCT process.416 
The reaction from most other Executive Directors, management, 
and staff was again largely negative. Two staff reports were drafted 
and discussed at the Executive Board meeting that largely rejected 
the idea, but suggested instead that the existing assessment of the 
anti-money laundering principles in the various supervisory principles 
(Basel Core Principles, IOSCO, and IAIS) be enhanced and that the 
IMF and World Bank work more closely with the FATF in ensuring 
compliance with these principles.417 The staff reports also suggested 
that the World Bank and IMF might recognize the FATF 40 as the 
anti-money laundering world standard, but that it would be up to the 
FATF and FATF-style regional bodies to assess compliance.418 The 
Board went along, noting in particular that the IMF should not 
become involved in “law enforcement.”419 
A key concern expressed by all the non-OECD Executive 
Directors at this time (and privately by a few OECD Directors) was 
that the FATF NCCT process was, in their opinion, anything but 
voluntary and cooperative in nature, and, therefore, anathema to 
both the Fund and the Bank’s culture and tradition in general and to 
the Financial Sector Assessment and Offshore Financial Sector 
programs specifically.420 They did not want the two international 
financial institutions to be seen to support in any way the NCCT 
 
 415. See, e.g., IMF, FINANCIAL SYSTEM ABUSE, supra note 154, at 17 (“We believe 
country programs and loan operations should incorporate, as appropriate, preconditions 
and performance criteria designed to help countries make real and measurable progress in 
combating money laundering. ROSCs offer a flexible process for incorporating 
assessments of countries’ observance of the FATF Forty Recommendations as another 
separate module.”). 
 416. The author discussed these issues with a number of senior U.S. authorities. 
 417. IMF & WORLD BANK, ENHANCING CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING: POLICY PAPER 14, box 1 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/ml/2001/eng/042601.pdf.  
 418. Id. at 15–16. 
 419. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 01/41, IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses 
Money Laundering (Apr. 29, 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/ 
PN0141.htm. 
 420. See id. (“[S]everal Directors noted that recognizing the FATF 40 
Recommendations did not constitute an endorsement of the non-voluntary and non-
cooperative manner in which the FATF applies the Recommendations.”). 
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process and contemplated ways in which the IMF and World Bank 
might work to soften or eliminate the entire NCCT program.421 
In spite of criticism, the NCCT process continued without the 
support of the two international financial institutions. In June of 2000, 
the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Liechtenstein had been 
removed from the list, while a number of onshore jurisdictions, 
including Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Myanmar, and 
Nigeria, were added.422 While the addition of these onshore 
jurisdictions somewhat muted the complaints that the NCCT process 
involved a ganging up of the powerful over the weakest, it also added 
voices of countries with significantly larger populations and political 
influence to the criticism of the process. 
The change in U.S. administrations, so important in re-framing 
the United States’ advocacy for the Harmful Tax Practices Project, 
may have affected U.S. support for anti-money laundering activities. 
At the IMF, it was rumored that the new officials involved in 
formulating U.S. policy toward tax havens believed that much of the 
U.S. policy on anti-money laundering was actually a subterfuge for 
closing down tax havens. The reason, it was rumored, was that the 
most important of the twenty-five non-cooperating country criteria 
were linked to piercing bank secrecy and sharing information, which 
were also central to uncovering U.S. persons who use tax havens to 
avoid or evade income tax. 
At this point, the efforts of the major onshore jurisdictions to 
involve the IMF (and to a lesser extent the World Bank) in their 
harmful tax practices and NCCT projects had largely failed beyond an 
enhanced emphasis on Basel Core Principle Fifteen, which required 
 
 421. In the Executive Board’s discussion of the role of the IMF in anti-money 
laundering efforts,  
Directors also stressed that the FATF process needs to be made consistent with 
the ROSC process—that is, the FATF standard needs to be applied uniformly, 
cooperatively, and on a voluntary basis—and that once this is done, the FATF 
could be invited to participate in the preparation of a ROSC module on money 
laundering. They called on the staffs of the Fund and the World Bank to 
contribute to the ongoing revision of the FATF 40 Recommendations and to 
discuss with the FATF the principles underlying the ROSC procedures and come 
back to the Board with a report and proposals.  
Id. 
 422. FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR 
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING MEASURES 3–4 (June 22, 2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/56/41/ 
33922055.pdf. 
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banks to have effective anti-money laundering programs.423 While the 
IMF’s project to assess OFC’s compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles (and occasionally the securities, IOSCO, and insurance, 
IAIS, principles) was proceeding, most offshore centers were actually 
receiving very good assessments.424 
Any remaining effort to derail plans for significant IMF and 
World Bank involvement in promoting compliance with anti-money 
laundering principles was rendered almost entirely irrelevant by the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Although 
the attacks were carried out inexpensively, the U.S. Treasury 
Department began immediately to push other members of the FATF 
to include terrorism financing as a central part of its mandate. On 
October 29 and 30, 2001, the FATF, meeting in an extraordinary 
plenary session in Washington, adopted eight new recommendations 
on terrorist financing.425 Soon after, the IMF Managing Director 
created a special task force to consider how to intensify IMF 
involvement in anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing 
projects.426 On November 5, 2001, the Task Force issued a report 
recommending that the IMF and World Bank endorse the FATF 40 
plus the eight new Special Recommendations (“FATF 40 + 8”) and 
begin to include the assessment of compliance with the FATF 40 + 8 
into the FSAP and OFC program.427 In addition, the report 
recommended that anti-money laundering and terrorism financing 
ROSCs be prepared once the already adopted rules for ROSC 
assessments could be achieved.428 The Task Force managed to find 
the previously missing mandate for activity in this area in the IMF’s 
role in overseeing the international financial system.429 Intellectually, 
this was a stretch, but politically, the results were unavoidable: the 
IMF’s management and Executive Board simply could not say no in 
the charged atmosphere that was the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks. In fact, the Task Force report states quite explicitly 
 
 423. For full text of this Principle, see BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS, supra note 213. 
 424. Interview with Rick McDonnel, supra note 370.  
 425. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and 
participated in these discussions. 
 426. The author of this Article was a member of the Task Force. 
 427. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING WORK 
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 14–15 (2001) [hereinafter IMF, 
INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT], https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2001/eng/ 
110501.pdf. 
 428. Id. at 16. 
 429. Id. at 5–6. 
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that the IMF’s involvement should be based not on its mandate but 
on the fact that 
[t]he Fund is a collaborative institution with near universal 
membership, which lends the Fund legitimacy and acceptance, 
and makes it a natural forum for sharing information and 
developing common approaches to issues. These strengths also 
make the Fund a vehicle for actively promoting desirable 
policies and standards in member countries.430 
The report also noted that the IMF already had experience in 
assessing compliance with other standards.431 In other words, the Task 
Force suggested that the IMF had as attributes many of the positive 
factors that lead to good standards systems. 
While the Task Force members were drafting the report, some 
Executive Directors made clear that they wanted not only for all 
offshore center assessments to include money laundering assessments, 
but that the offshore program be accelerated.432 There was some 
resistance to this on the part of many members of the Task Force, 
who felt that the events of September 11, 2001, had nothing to do 
with offshore centers and that resources could better be used 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, in the end, the Task Force report proposed 
increasing the target number of OFC assessments from ten to twenty 
per year so that two-thirds of the forty-two OFCs on the Financial 
Stability Forum’s list would be assessed by the end of 2002.433 The 
Executive Board agreed.434 
The report noted a number of other issues, including that in 
order for assessments of compliance to be as objective and uniform as 
possible, the new anti-money laundering and terrorism financing 
standard—FATF 40 + 8—needed an assessment methodology; 
without such a methodology, which already existed for Basel Core 
Principles assessments, there could be no objectivity.435 The report 
also suggested that the IMF and World Bank should not be involved 
in assessing compliance with criminal law matters and raised the 
 
 430. Id. at 10. 
 431. Id. at 10–11. 
 432. The author served as a senior staff member at the IMF during this time and 
participated in these discussions. 
 433. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT, supra note 427, at 15. 
 434. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 01/120, IMF, IMF Board Discusses the 
Fund’s Intensified Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter IMF Board Discussion], https://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn01120.htm. 
 435. IMF, INTENSIFIED FUND INVOLVEMENT, supra note 427, at 12. The meaning of 
these two paragraphs was understood as such by the authors of the paper. 
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question of how the activities of the IMF and World Bank would 
intersect with that of the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies.436 
Finally, the report discussed the NCCT process, which clearly 
breached the rules of the game for producing acceptable ROSCs: the 
NCCT process was not voluntary, not objectively applied across 
countries (e.g., there was no methodology for assessment), and was 
assessed using pass-fail ratings.437 In short, it flunked many of the 
attributes of a good standard system identified in Part I above. 
Although they did not explicitly mention the NCCT process, the 
Executive Board agreed that these issues had to be resolved before 
anti-money laundering ROSCs could be prepared and, in particular, 
that the process be “compatible with the uniform, voluntary, and 
cooperative nature of the ROSC exercise.”438 
At this point, an intense series of discussions began among key 
FATF members and senior staff with respect to the continuation of 
the NCCT process. In effect, management at the IMF and World 
Bank concluded that the Executive Board would not endorse an anti-
money laundering and terrorism financing ROSC while the FATF 
continued the NCCT process, while key FATF members insisted that 
the NCCT process was working and should be allowed to continue. 
Another issue was the assessment methodology document, which was 
needed if assessments were to be uniform and objective. The FATF 
agreed to complete the document and referred the job to the U.S. 
delegation, but their initial version was little more than a restatement 
of the FATF 40 + 8. As a result, IMF and World Bank staff agreed to 
complete the methodology with IMF staff taking the lead. The result 
was a highly detailed set of criteria that one staff member noted 
would “make it very hard for the FATF to be easy on themselves and 
hard on others.”439 IMF staff began to use the draft methodology to 
make anti-money laundering assessments in the OFC program, but 
not to publish ROSCs. 
By April, the Fund’s International Monetary and Financial 
Committee,440 chaired by the United Kingdom, called on the Fund to 
complete the anti-money laundering/combating financing of terrorism 
(“AML/CFT”) methodology “and the development of assessment 
 
 436. Id. at 12, 28, 34. 
 437. Id. at 27.  
 438. IMF Board Discussion, supra note 434. 
 439. The author of this Article was a principal author of the methodology. This view 
was widely held among staff. 
 440. For additional information on the IMFC, see IMF, A Guide to Committees, 
Groups, and Clubs, supra note 266. 
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procedures compatible with the uniform, voluntary, and cooperative 
nature of the ROSC process.”441 
In June of 2002, the FATF released its next non-cooperating 
countries report; fifteen jurisdictions were still listed, just under half 
of which were offshore centers, and none of which was particularly 
important in terms of percentage of total offshore business in the 
world442: the Cook Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Niue, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines.443 However, a number 
of the remaining onshore jurisdictions (including Egypt, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine) had relatively large 
economies compared to those of the smaller offshore centers and, 
therefore, could be influential with the IMF Board. 
The next staff paper proposed a pilot program of anti-money 
laundering assessments based on the new methodology to be 
undertaken by the IMF and World Bank and the FATF and FATF-
style regional bodies.444 However, given the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee’s statement, the authors insisted on 
standing up to the United States and France and insisted that all 
assessments embrace a process that was: 
uniform, including using the same methodology for all 
assessments (the FATF’s NCCT process uses a different 
methodology from those of mutual evaluations), voluntary (the 
FATF NCCT process is mandatory and can result in the 
imposition of sanctions) and cooperative, including not using a 
pass-fail approach (the FATF NCCT process labels 
jurisdictions either “cooperative” or “non-cooperative”) and 
giving the jurisdiction the opportunity to publish a right of reply 
alongside the ROSC (the FATF NCCT process does not allow 
such a right of reply).445 
 
 441. Press Release No. 02/22, IMF, Communiqué of the Int’l Monetary and Fin. 
Comm. of the Board of Governors of the IMF (Apr. 20, 2002), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0222.htm. 
 442. Interview with un-named senior staff member from a FATF-member country, in 
Washington, D.C. (June 2002). 
 443. FATF, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATING COUNTRIES AND 
TERRITORIES 4 (June 2002), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/32/ 
33922320.pdf. 
 444. IMF & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) MATERIALS CONCERNING STAFF PROGRESS 
TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AML/CFT METHODOLOGY AND 
ASSESSMENT PROCESS: JOINT PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE IMF AND 
WORLD BANK 10 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/061102.pdf. 
 445. Id. at 10 n.5. 
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The FATF flatly refused to give up the current NCCT round.446 
Thus followed another round of discussions with Executive Directors. 
A majority of those opposed to the NCCT process still favored 
accepting the FATF’s offer; they felt that it was the best they could 
get, and that having impartial IMF assessment of NCCT countries 
would act as a significant counterbalance to the “partial” and “unfair” 
NCCT assessments. Most of these Executive Directors did not 
represent jurisdictions on the NCCT list. Others representing 
constituencies that had been assessed through the NCCT process 
expressed concerns that such benefits would be outweighed by the 
legitimacy that an IMF/World Bank-endorsed FATF Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes would confer on the FATF and, 
therefore, on the NCCT process. 
In the end, the Board was split, adopting by a majority a twelve-
month pilot of anti-money laundering assessments and accompanying 
ROSCs. Under this pilot, the IMF and the World Bank were to 
complete some ROSCs while the FATF and FATF-style regional 
bodies were to continue to assess their own members.447 However, the 
Board insisted that FATF first agree to undertaking its mutual 
evaluations of its own members in a manner consistent with the 
ROSC process (including endorsing the new methodology and its use 
in undertaking FATF or FATF-style regional bodies and IMF and 
World Bank assessments) and that it agree “not [to] undertake a 
further round of the [NCCT] initiative, at least during the period of 
the 12-month pilot project.”448 
However, a number of Directors expressed their disapproval, 
saying that those conditions did not go far enough. They said that 
“reports on observance associated with FATF-led assessments 
[should] not be designated ROSCs unless the FATF undertook a 
blanket commitment not to undertake any further country 
assessments without the consent of the country, and acknowledge that 
it would accept the results of any Fund/Bank-led assessments.”449 
As the pilot program went forward, by the end of 2002, the eight 
offshore centers assessed, which included the formerly listed 
Liechtenstein, did quite well, with only Vanuatu showing a few 
remaining significant problems with respect to the quality of 
 
 446. The author was a party to these negotiations. 
 447. See Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/87, IMF, IMF Advances Efforts to 
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
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supervision in the offshore banking sector and non-bank financial 
institutions.450 The assessments merely showcased how effective 
jurisdictions were in implementing their anti-money laundering 
programs, in most cases noting great improvement in recent years.451 
However, the remaining OFCs on the FATF NCCT list did not 
request an immediate assessment. The following year, the Cook 
Islands requested and received an assessment from the IMF,452 with 
the staff report stating that the authorities “have strengthened the 
AML/CFT legal and institutional framework mainly in response to 
the FATF’s listing of the Cook Islands as a non-cooperative” but that 
“the efforts remain uneven,” noting that the FATF had not removed 
 
 450. See IMF, ANGUILLA—OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 24–32 
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, ANGUILLA], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/ 
cr03370.pdf; IMF, GUERNSEY—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 27–33 
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, GUERNSEY], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/ 
cr03364.pdf; IMF, ISLE OF MAN—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 21–27 
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, ISLE OF MAN], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/ 
cr03366.pdf; IMF, JERSEY—CROWN DEPENDENCY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 29–33 
(2003) [hereinafter IMF, JERSEY], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/ 
cr03368.pdf; IMF, LIECHTENSTEIN: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 33–39 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, LIECHTENSTEIN], 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03289.pdf; IMF, MONACO: ASSESSMENT OF 
THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW 
OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 28–39 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, 
MONACO], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03262.pdf; IMF, 
MONTSERRAT—OVERSEAS TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: ASSESSMENT OF 
THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR—REVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 20–27 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, 
MONTSERRAT], http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03371.pdf; IMF, 
VANUATU: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
61–67 (2003) [hereinafter IMF, VANUATU], 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03253.pdf. 
 451. See IMF, ANGUILLA, supra note 450, at 6; IMF, GUERNSEY, supra note 450, at 6; 
IMF, ISLE OF MAN, supra note 450, at 7; IMF, JERSEY, supra note 450, at 7; IMF, 
LIECHTENSTEIN, supra note 450, at 17, 35; IMF, MONACO, supra note 450, at 6; IMF, 
MONTSERRAT, supra note 450, at 6, 20. 
 452. They were also assessed as part of a mutual evaluation by the Asian FATF-style 
regional body. 
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the jurisdiction from the list.453 While the IMF provided free technical 
assistance to the Cook Islands,454 they remained on the NCCT list 
until 2005.455 If one theory was that involving the IMF in assessing 
anti-money laundering compliance would help get OFCs off the 
NCCT list, it did not appear to be playing out. 
There was an unanticipated effect on the onshore jurisdictions 
resulting from the involvement of the IMF in the anti-money 
laundering project. In agreeing to allow the FATF and FATF-style 
regional bodies to produce ROSCs, the IMF and World Bank insisted 
that they ensure uniformity through review of the former’s 
assessments.456 This did not go entirely well for the FATF and FATF-
style regional bodies, where a major review 
found a high degree of variability in the quality and consistency 
of reports prepared by [the FATF and FATF-style regional 
bodies] as well as within the same assessor group. While a large 
majority of reports were of high- or medium quality with 
respect to key components of the assessments, the treatment of 
ratings gave rise to greater problems. A number of initiatives 
have been taken or are underway to improve the quality and 
consistency of assessments by all assessor bodies, including: the 
standardization of documentation, the strengthening of 
peer/internal reviews, and the intensification of assessor 
training.457 
According to a law enforcement official from an FATF member, 
one result of this review was that if “the introduction of the 
methodology document killed some of the ‘I’ll scratch your back if 
you scratch mine’ attitude; this quality review will kill off more.”458 
The IMF staff’s review of the OFC program in 2003 generally 
gave OFCs high marks in anti-money laundering as well as banking 
supervision, noting that they “compare[d] favorably” with onshore 
 
 453. IMF, COOK ISLANDS: ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR VOLUME I—REVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION 8, 32 (2004), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04413.pdf. 
 454. See id. at 12 (referencing gains produced by “work undertaken by an IMF 
[technical assistance] mission in 2002 and other donors”).  
 455. FATF, ANNUAL AND OVERALL REVIEW OF NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES 
AND TERRITORIES 1 (2005), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/26/34988035.pdf. 
 456. See IMF & WORLD BANK, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM: REVIEW OF THE QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY OF 
ASSESSMENT REPORTS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COORDINATION 3 (2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/041806r.pdf. 
 457. See id. (emphasis omitted). 
 458. Comment by a senior IMF staff member to the author immediately following the 
publication of the report. 
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jurisdictions of similar wealth.459 The review again found no serious 
systemic risk. The review the following year actually found that 
compliance levels for OFCs for money laundering were, as with 
banking supervision, more favorable than for other jurisdictions.460 As 
discussed in Part II.C above, in 2008, the offshore financial 
assessment program was merged with the FSAP program, treating 
offshore centers like their onshore counterparts.461 
As a result of the IMF’s insistence that offshore centers be 
assessed in a fair, consistent, and uniform manner, it was shown that 
those centers largely conformed to the universal anti-money 
laundering and terrorism financing standards. Offshore centers had 
scored another significant victory. 
With the NCCT process, the anti-money laundering standards 
system started out with many detrimental attributes. Even so, the fact 
that the FATF had some positive TRN characteristics (such as 
participation of some local regulatory bodies and the absence of pure 
state control of membership), plus the fact that the FATF-style 
bodies included many more members, did help in creating a far more 
generally accepted standard than did the OECD with respect to its 
Harmful Tax Practices Project. However, once the system was 
changed from the NCCT to uniform assessment of the same standards 
by the IMF (and other quasi-TRNs under IMF oversight), the system 
assumed far more beneficial than detrimental attributes. Once again, 
participation of the IMF, an international organization with TRN 
attributes, made the difference. It not only produced generally 
accepted standards applied and implemented impartially, but also it 
helped protect the interests of weak states over the strong. 
III.  SUCCESSES AND FAILURES: THE SYSTEM AND TRN 
CHARACTERISTICS 
A. Deconstructing the System 
While onshore centers achieved much of what they claimed they 
wanted with respect to each of the three areas of complaint, the 
processes and results were different. The first system, the Harmful 
Tax Practices Project, was widely criticized. The second, the Global 
 
 459. See IMF, 2003 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 332, at 10–14 (describing the results 
of both banking and money laundering assessments). 
 460. IMF, 2004 ASSESSMENT PROGRAM UPDATE, supra note 331, at 7, 22–25 app. II. 
 461. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/82, IMF, Executive Board Integrates the 
Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program with the FSAP (July 9, 2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/pn0882.htm. 
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Forum, is far less unpopular. Offshore centers, by agreeing to provide 
taxpayer information to onshore centers, should wind up being less 
easy locations for onshore residents to commit tax evasion. That 
being said, the onshore jurisdictions are by no means fully satisfied; 
offshore centers will still make income tax evasion somewhat easier 
for determined tax-evading onshore residents. However, the resulting 
income tax standards, limited to transparency and sharing of 
information, are largely agreed upon and the system implementing 
these standards is far less controversial. With respect to prudential 
regulation, the story was quite different. Offshore centers not only 
adopted and implemented the generally accepted financial regulatory 
standards of onshore jurisdictions, they did (overall) a better job at 
implementing them than did onshore jurisdictions. There is little 
complaint from anyone over the standards themselves or the system 
of implementation. Much the same can be said of anti-money 
laundering and terrorism financing standards, at least after the 
completion of the non-cooperating countries and territories process. 
1.  Income Taxation 
With respect to the original Harmful Tax Practices Project, there 
was no real transnational regulatory network and no generally 
accepted standard.462 Onshore centers sought to use the OECD to 
develop a generally accepted standard and to assess compliance with 
that standard.463 Onshore centers no doubt would have preferred that 
offshore centers accept the standard through peer pressure or 
persuasion. As it turned out, the offshore centers (as well as other 
jurisdictions) were not convinced that the standard actually was a best 
practice; they neither accepted that income taxation was the best way 
to raise revenue nor believed that they should give up all of the 
benefits of offering tax avoidance or evasion possibilities to onshore 
residents.464 They also did not accept that the OECD’s assessment 
process was legitimate. The OECD members’ fall-back position was 
to use the hard power of coordinated action by their local tax 
authorities against their own residents who did business with offshore 
centers. This resulted in an even more significant outcry against the 
alleged illegitimacy of the entire OECD process. 
The first departure from the paradigm TRN process was the 
absence of a generally accepted standard. There were not only good 
 
 462. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.  
 463. See supra notes 94, 124 and accompanying text.  
 464. See supra notes 80–86, 172 and accompanying text.  
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economic arguments against the income tax in general; there were, at 
least from the perspective of offshore jurisdictions, very good 
arguments as to why they should not adopt an income tax, including 
that other taxes, such as import duties, were more appropriate for 
their particular economies.465 As the IMF noted, there was no 
international obligation for one member to adopt policies that were 
injurious to themselves to benefit other members.466 With no genuine 
agreement on a standard, it was difficult to impose one. One can 
argue that the onshore centers tried to use the OECD to help 
legitimize the “standard” by formally adopting it the way a TRN 
might, but the effort largely failed. Unlike TRNs, such as the Basel 
Committee, the OECD was not a group of technical experts but 
rather a club of states.467 To make matters even worse, the OECD 
shared the undesirable TRN quality of being a select club, consisting 
only of wealthy onshore jurisdictions.468 Onshore jurisdictions turned 
to the IMF to remedy some of these deficiencies, but the IMF refused 
to participate—again because staff did not accept the underlying 
argument that the proposed standards were really best practices 
appropriate for all jurisdictions.469 Next, the compliance assessment 
process was also conducted by the OECD, further depressing the 
perception of legitimacy. At the end of this process, the only tool 
available to the onshore jurisdictions to reach compliance was the 
hard power of onshore regulatory authorities.470 Though somewhat 
successful, the income tax standards system was turning out to be by 
far the least satisfactory of the three. 
The shift by the OECD from the problematic paradigm of the 
Harmful Tax Practices Project to the Global Forum on Transparency 
cured many of these defects. It created a far more inclusive sub-
organization—the Global Forum—and adopted another standard, 
one that was less stringent but more acceptable to offshore 
jurisdictions (as well as others).471 The OECD (as the Forum) 
adopted a system of assessment that, by being less arbitrary and 
including a review process for the countries affected, adopted many 
of the positive features of the most successful TRNs.472 While 
participation of the IMF (if transparency and exchange of 
 
 465. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.  
 466. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  
 467. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 468. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 469. See supra notes 100–01, 110–11, 156–57 and accompanying text.  
 470. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.  
 471. See supra notes 181–82, 197–98 and accompanying text.  
 472. See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.  
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information in tax matters were ever deemed to be a part of its 
mandate) might have added even more protection, at least the Global 
Forum’s standard and assessment procedures were moving in the 
right direction both to add to the legitimacy of the process and to 
protect the legitimate interests of OFCs. 
2.  Prudential Regulation 
With respect to prudential regulation, starting in the mid-1970s, 
there was a real transnational regulatory network—the Basel 
Committee—and a generally accepted (though evolving) standard. 
Unlike the absence of an income tax, poor prudential regulation in 
one jurisdiction actually could cause problems for all jurisdictions, 
including offshore centers. There was a potential legitimacy 
deficiency with respect to the standard adopted in that the Basel 
Committee consisted of only a small number of onshore regulators. 
However, the later acceptance of the standard by the Offshore Group 
of Banking Supervisors (which included many offshore centers) 
largely remedied that deficiency.473  
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, when onshore centers 
sought to cast blame for banking and other financial failures on 
offshore centers, onshore countries enlisted the IMF to add 
legitimacy to the process.474 The IMF added a few positive TRN-like 
aspects, but more importantly (given the participation of the Basel 
Committee), corrected some typical TRN deficiencies. Most states 
were members of the IMF, resulting in broader representation 
(sometimes indirectly and imperfectly, such as with British Caribbean 
jurisdictions).475 IMF staff acted with relative independence from 
member states and had significant independent technical 
knowledge.476 The IMF provided a review of the standards and a way 
of assessing compliance with those standards separate from the Basel 
Committee or any member states. In particular, the assessment 
process was designed to be as objective as possible, providing 
significant procedural protections for complying jurisdictions.477 The 
process determined that OFCs were largely in compliance with the 
standard, making it much more difficult for onshore jurisdictions to 
implement (via their regulators) “countermeasures” against residents 
 
 473. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.  
 474. See supra notes 254, 258, 267–71 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 476. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 477. See supra notes 267–69, 274–84 and accompanying text. 
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doing business with offshore centers.478 To the extent that onshore 
jurisdictions were trying to use the Basel Core Principles as a back-
door to forcing greater compliance with the failed income tax 
“standards,” this also failed.  
3.  Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing  
With respect to anti-money laundering and terrorism financing, 
the system evolved as a kind of combination of the previous two. The 
G-7 began the FATF as a kind of TRN. While the FATF was 
technically a state membership task force, states largely were 
represented by domestic regulatory authorities as well as by domestic 
law enforcement.479 The anti-money laundering standards (and later 
anti-terrorism financing standards) developed by domestic authorities 
and endorsed by the FATF were generally accepted as best practices 
by offshore centers via the OGBS and the CFATF and later other 
relevant FATF-style regional bodies.480 Unlike domestic bank 
failures, however, domestic money laundering was far less of a threat 
to offshore centers in that criminals were committing their crimes 
onshore. Perhaps as a result, many offshore centers were less 
interested in suffering the direct and indirect costs (including losing 
banking clients who were relying on bank secrecy to evade domestic 
income taxation) of enforcing the standards.481 As with the OECD’s 
Harmful Tax Practices Project, the FATF responded with its Non-
Cooperating Countries and Territories project. However, offshore 
centers again objected to the assessment process as illegitimate,482 in 
part because the assessments did not use the FATF 40 as the standard 
and because the methodology for assessment was particularly 
subjective.483 
Again, the IMF was enlisted, perhaps in part to add legitimacy to 
the process.484 The IMF added a key procedural benefit by creating a 
detailed assessment methodology, resulting in a far more objective 
assessment process.485 Also, by agreeing to participate, the FATF had 
to agree to abandon the NCCT process.486 
 
 478. See supra notes 321–39 and accompanying text. 
 479. See supra notes 38, 352–58 and accompanying text.  
 480. See supra notes 360–62 and accompanying text. 
 481. See supra notes 374–77 and accompanying text. 
 482. See supra notes 378–80 and accompanying text. 
 483. See supra notes 385–88, 401–05 and accompanying text. 
 484. See supra notes 415–17, 430 and accompanying text. 
 485. See supra notes 438–39 and accompanying text. 
 486. See supra notes 445–49 and accompanying text. 
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As with its assessment of OFCs’ compliance with Basel Core 
Principles, the IMF determined that OFCs were largely in compliance 
with the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing standard, 
making it much more difficult for onshore jurisdictions to implement 
countermeasures.487  
This Article began with a quotation suggesting that powerful 
governments may once again strike out against OFCs, this time 
blaming them for the current financial crisis. But perhaps past 
experience has actually tamed the response. The G-20 (itself a more 
inclusive group than the G-8 at the time of the Asian financial crisis) 
statement in April of 2009 specifically resolved to “take action against 
non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens.”488 However, 
assessments of OFCs’ prudential and anti-money laundering practices 
were firmly in the hands of TRNs and the IMF, which have shown in 
the past their ability to act fairly in assessing well-accepted standards. 
The G-20 did state that “[w]e stand ready to deploy sanctions to 
protect our public finances and financial systems.”489 But to that 
effect, they mention only that “[t]he era of banking secrecy is over. 
We note that the OECD has today published a list of countries 
assessed by the Global Forum against the international standard for 
exchange of tax information.”490 But the Global Forum, with its well-
accepted standards on transparency and improved assessment 
process, would be less fearsome to OFCs than the original form of the 
Harmful Tax Practice Project. 
B. Some Proposed Modifications to TRN and Standards Theory 
The experience of offshore centers with proposed global 
standards in income taxation, prudential regulation, and anti-money 
laundering generally confirms the important role played by trans-
national regulatory networks. States not only acted alone in the 
international system but through their various domestic governmental 
institutions, including tax and financial regulatory agencies (and, 
where relevant, legislatures and law enforcement). The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision played a particularly important 
role. The Basel Committee, through application of the collective 
expertise of its members and through the building of consensus and 
 
 487. See supra notes 451–55 and accompanying text. 
488.  GROUP OF 20, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY & REFORM, para. 15 (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf. 
 489. Id.  
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other “soft power” methods, worked successfully to convince all 
regulators that their Basel Core Principles were in fact best practices. 
Also, as predicted by theory, the Basel Committee still had some 
legitimacy issues, including its limited membership and the fact that 
there was no other TRN independent of the Basel group with 
sufficient expertise to review the standards or to undertake objective 
assessments of compliance. 
The OFCs’ experience also validates the proposed theory that 
certain non-TRNs with TRN characteristics can combine with TRNs 
to create a far more legitimate and effective system for creating and 
spreading the effect of global standards. The IMF was able to play 
this role by supplying some of the helpful features missing from the 
Basel Committee. The IMF had a near universal membership. The 
fact that IMF members were states and not local expert regulators 
was mitigated by the relative independence of a highly expert staff. 
The IMF supplied both an independent review of the standards and a 
relatively neutral and subjective method for assessment of 
compliance. Thus, an organization with beneficial TRN and non-TRN 
characteristics may help mitigate the predicated deficiencies of a 
TRN; together they may advance the adoption of best practices 
creating the most effective and beneficial standards system. 
The combination of the Basel Committee and IMF also helped 
protect offshore centers from the predations of onshore centers. 
Because of the transparent legitimacy of the system, onshore 
regulators were constrained from acting against resident financial 
institutions that did business with financial institutions in offshore 
centers. Thus, the combination of an organization with beneficial 
TRN and non-TRN characteristics may protect relatively weak states 
from the self-interested actions of the strong, creating a better 
standards system. 
The OECD and FATF had a more difficult time, demonstrating 
the problems of operating without the legitimacy of a TRN and/or an 
organization with TRN (and certain non-TRN) characteristics. With 
respect to the Harmful Tax Practices Project, the OECD did not have 
enough positive TRN characteristics to achieve legitimacy. By moving 
to the Global Forum on Transparency, it did. The FATF did not have 
quite enough positive TRN characteristics to achieve enough 
legitimacy. It was, however, able to involve the IMF, whose beneficial 
TRN and non-TRN characteristics helped once again to create a 
legitimate system of review and assessment, advancing best practices 
and protecting weak states from the actions of the strong. Thus, a 
system that combines the most beneficial TRN and non-TRN 
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characteristics among participating organizations results in the most 
effective and beneficial standards system. 
The OFC experience suggests two additional observations. 
Outside observers accept that the substantive standards of TRNs are 
accepted as best practices because observers (largely) agree that they 
are best. Had the IMF agreed to adopt the OECD’s standards, it 
would have been through political influence of member states or 
some other means that would render meaningless its beneficial TRN 
(and beneficial non-TRN) characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
The title of this Article is “On the Use and Abuse of Standards 
for Law.” With respect to the OFC experience with prudential 
regulation and anti-money laundering rules, the use of standards for 
“law” (using the word “law” here to mean a rule that is, practically 
speaking, not optional), standards are well “used.” The combination 
of the Basel Committee/FATF and the IMF, with the former using 
relatively independent expertise to create the standards and the latter 
using more representative, if less expert, skill to review and assess 
compliance, resulted in a (relatively) positive result, both in terms of 
substance and procedural fairness. The hard power of local regulators 
was guided, and restrained, by the process. The process is relatively 
free from the often problematic origins of traditional international 
law, guided as it is by states’ views of principle or ideology (both of 
which may not be guided by technical expertise applied to solve 
technical problems) and state self-interest (which can overwhelm 
both technical considerations and the interests of weak states). 
This Article views the larger onshore centers’ attempt to use the 
OECD to create and enforce income tax rules as an attempt to abuse 
standards as law. In fact, the OECD did not succeed in creating and 
implementing a generally accepted standard that satisfied all parties 
and that protected the legitimate interests of the weak against the 
strong. While OECD members were able to force much of the 
OECD’s agenda on OFCs through the coordinated threat of imposing 
the hard power of domestic tax authorities, the apparent lack of the 
system’s full legitimacy worked to reduce its effectiveness. Brute 
force has always been available to powerful states to force change on 
weaker states; the attempt to create an income tax standard did not 
change that fact, though it may very well have mitigated its 
effectiveness. The OECD’s partial retreat into the Global Forum and 
its less heinous standard and fairer method of assessment is perhaps 
proof of this. 
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Another way of viewing the use (and failure of the abuse) of 
standards for law is the triumph of objectivity. The application of 
technical expertise to solve technical problems is designed to be 
objective (based on facts) and not subjective (based on viewpoint). 
The standards are reviewed by an objective process. They are then 
generally accepted through objective review by domestic sub-state 
actors. The assessment of compliance is accomplished by an objective 
process. Ratings of compliance can then be used by local sub-state 
actors to guide their application of hard power. 
What then is the answer to the question posed by Nietzsche: 
Does the objectivity implied in the use of standards for law originate 
in a “heightened need and demand for justice,” or does objectivity 
just “create the appearance” of such need? A comparison of the 
serious criticism levied on the false application of objectivity in the 
income tax area with the general acceptance of the real application of 
objectivity in the other areas argues for a tentative “yes.” The validity 
of this tentative “yes” may be tested during the current period of 
international recession. No doubt OFCs are hoping that it is not 
merely a “detrimental and too flattering bias.” 
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APPENDIX: FSF, OECD, AND FATF LISTS491 
 
COUNTRY FSF OFC 
Prudential 
3rd Tier 
List 
2000 
OECD 
Tax 
Havens 
2000 
OECD 
Tax 
Havens 
2001 
OECD 
Tax 
Havens 
2004 
OECD 
Tax 
Havens 
2006 
FATF 
NCCTs 
2000 
FATF 
NCCTs 
2001 
FATF 
NCCTs 
2002 
FATF 
NCCTs 
2005 
FATF 
NCCTs 
June 
2006 
AFRICA           
Egypt       X X   
Liberia  X X X       
Maldives  X         
Seychelles X X         
ASIA and PACIFIC          
Cook Islands X X    X X X   
Indonesia       X X   
Marshall 
Islands 
X X X X  X X    
Myanmar 
(Burma) 
      X X X X 
Nauru X X X   X X X X  
Niue X X    X X    
Samoa X X         
Tonga  X         
Vanuatu X X X        
EUROPE           
Andorra  X X X X      
Cyprus X          
Gibraltar  X         
Guernsey  X         
Hungary       X    
Isle of Man  X         
Jersey  X         
Liechtenstein X X X X X X     
 
 491. Brigitte Unger & Joras Ferweda, Regulating Money Laundering and Tax Havens: 
The Role of Blacklisting 5–6, 8–9 (Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht 
School of Economics, Discussion Paper Series No. 08-12, 2008), available at 
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/08-12.pdf; IMF, Offshore Financial Centers IMF 
Background Paper (June 23, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/ 
back.htm. 
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Monaco  X X X X      
Russia      X X    
Ukraine       X X   
MIDDLE EAST          
Bahrain  X         
Israel      X X    
Lebanon X     X X    
AMERICAS           
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
X X         
Anguilla X X         
Aruba X X         
Bahamas X X    X     
Barbados  X         
Belize X X         
Bermuda           
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
X X         
Cayman 
Islands 
X     X     
Costa Rica X          
Dominica  X    X X    
Grenada  X     X X   
Montserrat  X         
Netherlands 
Antilles 
X X         
St. Kitts & 
Nevis 
X X    X X    
St. Lucia X X         
St. Vincent 
& the 
Grenadines 
X X    X X X   
Turks & 
Caicos 
Islands 
X X         
 
